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INTRODUCTION

Conventional narratives maintain that groups lacking political power
litigate because they cannot attain their goals politically. They predict that
American Indians-who remain the most impoverished group in the United
States and are hardly electorally significant with two percent of the population spread across 35 states-will pursue litigation strategies.' In contrast to
the prevailing narrative, lawyers, tribal advocates, and political scientists
have suggested that American Indians have increasingly engaged in political
advocacy since the mid-twentieth century.
In this Article, I extend my earlier research investigating the relationships among groups, courts, and political processes by starting to evaluate
the widely-accepted proposition that groups that lack political power litigate
through a case study of American Indian advocacy at the end of the twentieth century. 2 American Indian advocacy is a particularly rich setting for investigating how and why groups craft advocacy strategies over time.
American Indians, and especially Indian nations, have a long and rich history of engaging with the United States government.' Since its formation,
the United States has established legal relationships with American Indians,
treating them as separate political communities or tribes.4 During the first
century of its existence, the United States government and Indian nations
entered into over 400 treaties.5 These treaties acknowledge the tribes' preexisting and ongoing rights and governmental authority. Treaties, federal legis' Federal and State Recognized Tribes, NATL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/state-tribal-institutelist-of-federal-and-state-recognizedtribes.aspx [https://perma.cc/GKZ3-44d9] (last updated Oct. 2016).
2 Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. COLo. L. REV. 78, 82-83 (2015)
(questioning whether advocates should assume that legislatures treat Indians more favorably
than courts without systematic, empirical data on the amount and kinds of Indian-related legislation enacted by Congress and producing the first comprehensive study of Indian-related
legislation).
See generally FREDRICK E. HoxiE, THIS INDIAN COUNTRY: AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVISTS
AND THE PLACE THEY MADE (2013); EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE
Sioux NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT (1991) (documenting over

two decades of Sioux advocacy for a congressional act authorizing the bringing of the Black
Hills claim in federal court).
' See generally Carol Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The
Impact of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1123 (1994).
' See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

§

1.03[l] (2012). Congress unilater-

ally ended treaty making with Indian nations in 1871 and started dealing with Indian nations
statutorily. INDIAN LAW RES. CENT., NATIVE LAND LAW: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELATING TO NATIVE LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES 123-24 (2012).
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lation, and Supreme Court decisions form the basic legal framework
governing Indians in the United States today. The key elements of this
framework include: federal recognition of inherent governmental authority
possessed by Indian tribes, which usually supplants state powers; a federal
trust obligation toward and special federal powers over Indian tribes and
their citizens; and federally protected lands for designated Indian tribes.'
Indian nations have interacted with the federal government in various
ways over the past five centuries. Some Indian nations have petitioned and
sent delegates to Washington, D.C. to meet with members of the Executive
Branch -and Congress.' Others have litigated, protested, occupied federal
lands, or exercised treaty rights. Over time, different tribes have used various combinations of these strategies.' Despite this variation, few scholars
have studied, and to my knowledge none have systematically documented,
the different strategies used by American Indians.'
This Article starts to fill the gap in existing knowledge about American
Indian advocacy by presenting the first comprehensive study of reported lobbying by American Indian tribes and organizations. Part II describes the
study and situates it within the history of American Indian advocacy more
generally. Part m reveals a dramatic 600 percent increase in reported lobbying by American Indian tribes and organizations from 1978 to 2012.10 This
increase exceeds the rise in legislative advocacy that has occurred more generally in the U.S. population over the past five decades." My findings, however, mirror those of other scholars who have documented other politically

See generally Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 4.
See Hoxie, supra note 3, at 70-71 (documenting Choctaw delegations to Washington,
D.C. in the 1820s); W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN
POLrrIcs 40 (2000); see also Daniel Carpenter, On the Emergence of the Administrative Petition: Innovations in Nineteenth-Century Indigenous North America, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAw 349 (Nicholas
R. Parrillo ed.) (2017).
'See, e.g., DAVID E. WILKINs & HEIDI K. STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE
AMERICAN PoITICAL SYSTEM 165-70, 189-209 (3d ed. 2011).
9 See infra Part II.A.
`0 The author generated this percentage from original quantitative data she collected and
analyzed. For a full discussion of the author's data collection methods, see infra Part II.
" See BURDET[ A. Loomis & WENDY J. SCHILLER, THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS 38
(4th ed. 2004) (documenting a 300 percent increase in the number of registered lobbyists from
1981 to 2001-from 6,000 registered lobbyists in 1981 to 20,000 in 2001); see also JEFFREY
M. BERRY & CLYDE WILcox, THE INTEREST GROUP SoCIETY 17-22 (5th ed. 2016) (documenting the increase in lobbying over time more generally); Frank Baumgartner, et al., Congressional and PresidentialEffects on the Demandfor Lobbying, 64 POL. RES. Q. 3, 4 (2011)
(documenting the same); Beth Leech, et al., Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government
Activity and the Demand for Advocacy, 58 POL. RES. Q. 19, 20 (2005) (documenting the
same). Sociolegal studies confirm the escalation in legislative activity reported by political
scientists. See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner'sReflections on PoliticalLawyering,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 304 (1996); Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2010); Deborah L. Rhode, Public
Interest Low: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2046-48 (2008).
6

26

Harvard Journalon Legislation

[Vol. 56

powerless groups, including individuals with disabilities 2 and marriage
equality activists" engaged in legislative strategies. Moreover, my research
suggests considerable variation among Indian tribes in their lobbying efforts
and qualitative changes in lobbying as some Indian tribes have expanded
their lobbying efforts beyond traditional Indian law topics. The extraordinary
increase in the use of legislative strategies by American Indians, especially
when considered as related to the larger trend towards increased lobbying in
the United States, calls into question the prevailing narrative about when and
why groups advocate in particular institutions.
Contrary to the dominant narrative, my data reveal that some groups
may choose to lobby even if the odds seem stacked against them. Lobbying
gained momentum as a viable strategy for American Indians in the late
1970s even though they had little political influence, the courts were still
largely receptive to their claims, and gaming had yet to infuse some tribes
with new financial resources to support their political efforts. American Indians did not turn to Congress because the courts were unavailable, and they
did not abandon their litigation strategies in appealing to Congress. Rather,
they appear to have been using legislative advocacy as a parallel or complement to other strategies. My findings, thus, suggest that groups may turn to
legislative advocacy when they appear to lack political power even if another institution is receptive to their claims. Moreover, they indicate that
groups may utilize legislative advocacy in a broader array of circumstances
than usually thought. These circumstances include but are not limited to using legislative advocacy as a parallel, an alternative, a complement, or a
precursor to litigation. 4 My data, thus, indicates that the common wisdom is
either just plain wrong or substantially oversimplifies how, when, and why
groups chose advocacy strategies. 5
12 See Neta Ziv, Cause Lawyers, Clients, and the State: Congress as a Forumfor Cause
Lawyering During the Enactment of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE TN THE Gt oBAL ERA 212 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds.) (2001);
see also Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 11, at 1248-62.
" See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 11, at 1242.
14 See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from
Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 616 (2009); Michael McCann & William
Haltom, Alta Shrugged: Why PersonalInjury Lawyers Are Not Public Defenders of Their Own
Causes, in THE WoRLos CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY TN LEGAL PRACTICE 433-38 (Austin Sarat ed.) (2005) (describing parallel legislative and litigation strategies
by the American Trial Lawyers Association to curb tort law reform).
'5 Skepticism about the prevailing narrative is not new. Several different literatures question aspects of this popular narrative and suggest its limited utility as a general proposition.
Robert Dahl investigated the assertion that the Supreme Court's primary role is to protect the
rights of the minority against the tyranny of the majority and found that "policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the
lawmaking majorities of the United States." Robert A. Dahl, Decisionmakingin a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957). While political
scientists have contested Dahl's findings, see, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court
and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 50, 50-51 (1976), some scholars have
grown increasingly skeptical about the usefulness of litigation as a tool for successful law
reform or policy change. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JlM CROW TO Civo, RIGHTS
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Part IV answers an even more important question raised by problematizing the prevailing narrative: how and why do groups craft advocacy strategies? This question is not new. But in answering it, few scholars have
questioned a key assumption underlying the dominant narrative, namely its
treatment of advocacy strategies as a dichotomous choice between litigation
and legislative strategies. By and large, political scientists and sociolegal
scholars have continued to rely on this assumption in formulating
frameworks for understanding how groups craft advocacy strategies. Political scientists have focused on explaining why groups lobby while sociolegal
scholars have investigated why groups litigate. 16 In contrast, my data demonstrate that American Indians did not face a binary choice when they turned to
lobbying strategies in the 1970s. Rather they actively engaged in both litigation and legislation. Like previous empirical studies, my findings suggest
that viewing advocacy strategies as an either/or choice oversimplifies how
advocates actually craft advocacy strategies. I argue that abandoning this
assumption and combining insights from the political science and sociolegal
literatures allows for the development of a more generalizable theory about
how and why groups craft advocacy strategies in multiple institutions over
time. The value of a more generalizable theory cannot be overstated in an era
when advocates increasingly pursue advocacy strategies in non-judicial contexts and in multiple institutions simultaneously.
Part V then proposes a more generalizable and relational approach for
understanding how and why groups craft advocacy strategies across institutions over time. I combine insights from the existing sociolegal and political
science approaches to construct a generally applicable framework for understanding the evolution of advocacy strategies. Consistent with the sociolegal
approach,'" I conceptualize the development of advocacy strategies as an
ongoing and interactive process. Treating the development of advocacy strategies as an interactive process allows for in-depth exploration of the dynamic interplay among the factors influencing how strategies develop over
time. From the interest group literature, I borrow the factors found to influence lobbying and integrate them into the sociolegal approach to emphasize
the ongoing, dynamic nature of crafting advocacy strategies.
My approach improves upon existing frameworks in three main ways.
First, it goes beyond existing sociolegal and interest group approaches to
consider a fuller range of factors influencing advocacy strategies and how
those factors interact in complex ways over time to shape and reshape strate4-7 (2004); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SoCIAL
CHANGE? 336-343 (1991); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 4-10, 97-116 (1974). Political scientists have also argued
that some minority groups actually fare better in the political process. See MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACnION: PUBLIC GooDS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 35 (1971).
16 See infra Part IH.
1 See supra note 3.
See generally MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQuIry REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
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gies. It highlights how changes in one factor may facilitate changes in
others, either spurring or deterring the adoption of a particular strategy. For
example, a change in the political context, such as the loss of the support of
political elites due to electoral losses, may encourage a group to reconsider a
legislative strategy.' 9 Moreover, it emphasizes how feedback loops may develop among factors, reinforcing existing conditions supportive of a particular advocacy strategy. Second, my approach allows for in-depth exploration
of the relational aspects of making advocacy decisions. Advocates choose
strategies while considering the alternatives. The receptivity of one institution may encourage or discourage advocacy in another institution, but that
receptivity may shift over time, causing advocates to reconsider or alter their
strategies. For example, marriage equality advocates considered litigating,
but court decisions unsupportive of gay rights encouraged them to rethink
that strategy and consider legislative ones instead. 20 Examining institutional
interactions reveals the relational aspects of advocacy choices, including
how a group's strategy may depend on how it perceives its chances of success in another institution and how such perceptions change over time.
Third, my approach models a way for scholars to devise more complex understandings of advocacy strategies and how they develop in and across different institutions over time.
In Part VI, I demonstrate the value of my approach by using it to explain the explosion in legislative advocacy by American Indians from 1978
to 2012. American Indians increased lobbying after a dramatic shift in federal Indian policy in 1975. The creation of a new federal Indian policy signaled a change in the receptivity of members of Congress toward Indian
claims and opened the door for American Indians to lobby. Around the same
time, the Senate created the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, which provided access to Congress and new opportunities for American Indians to
engage in legislative strategies. Lacking in financial resources and electoral
clout, American Indians nonetheless used these opportunities to build relationships with members of Congress and their staffers, which further reinforced their access to the legislative process. American Indians continued to
use legislative strategies as the Supreme Court grew increasingly hostile towards their claims in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the emergence of Indian gaming further encouraged and reinforced American Indian legislative advocacy.
The American Indian case study illustrates how strategies develop in response to a confluence of factors that evolve over time, including changes in
the political context, the development of a group's own political capacity, a

" See, e.g., Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics of Reform: Lessons from
School Finance Litigation in Kentucky 1984-1995, 26 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 631, 655-58
(2001) (explaining how established interest groups changed strategies and formed a coalition
in response to changes in the governorship in Kentucky in 1988, which led to executivelegislative gridlock over education reforms and court intervention in education policy).
20 See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 11, at 1248-62.
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dramatic shift in institutional receptivity, and the infusion of new financial
resources.
Part VII concludes by considering the implications of the approach for
studies of advocacy strategies, interest groups, and federal Indian law. My
research demonstrates that groups may turn to legislative advocacy more
frequently and in different ways than previously thought, which suggests
that scholars need to think more carefully about how interactions among
different factors affect advocacy strategies over time. It also raises important
questions about the role of American Indians in the political process, including the impact of their lobbying on substantive policy and the success of
their legislative advocacy.
II.

EMPIRICALLY INVESTIGATING THE PREVAILING NARRATIVE: AMERICAN
INDIANS AND LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY,

1978-2012

This Part describes how I investigated the prevailing narrative that politically powerless groups choose litigation strategies by empirically documenting American Indian legislative advocacy at the end of the twentieth
century. Part II.A situates the study in the history of American Indian advocacy generally. Part II.B explains the data collection, methodology, and limits of the study.
A.

American Indian Advocacy in Historical Perspective

American Indian advocacy predates the formation of the United States.
Indian nations started petitioning colonial governments almost as soon as
Europeans landed on American soil.21 They have continually advocated for
the recognition and protection of their tribal sovereignty and land rights
since then. During the nineteenth century, Indian nations used the treaty22
making process to retain their existing governmental and property rights.
Indian nations also petitioned and sent delegates to Washington, D.C. to
meet with members of the Executive Branch and Congress. 23 They continued
to petition and send delegations to Washington, D.C. after Congress unilaterally terminated treaty-making in 1871.24
21

See HERMAN

VIOLA, DIPLOMATS IN BUCKSKINS: A HIsTORY OF INDIAN DELEGATIONS IN

CITY 13-21 (1995); Carpenter, supra note 7, at 349.
WASHINGTON
22
See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at § 1.03[1]; INDIAN LAw RES. Carr., supra

note 5, at 123. For example, Anishinaabek nations in present day Wisconsin and Minnesota
negotiated the retention of their hunting, gathering, and fishing rights even when they ceded
lands to the United States government. 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa, Chippewa-U.S., July
29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536; see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.
172, 175 (1999).
23 See Hoxm, supra note 3, at 70-71 (documenting Choctaw delegations to Washington,
D.C. in the 1820s); see also W. DALE MASON, supra note 7, at 40; Carpenter, supra note 7, at
349.
24 See Viola, supra note 21, at 190-99.
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Indian nations have used different advocacy strategies over time. As
early as the 1830s, Indian tribes started utilizing United States courts to protect their land and sovereignty rights. 25 Others have gone to war, protested,
occupied federal lands, exercised treaty rights, or used various combinations
of these strategies to protect their interests and resist encroachments on their
lands and rights. 26
American Indian advocacy continued into the twentieth century. 27 The
twentieth century, however, brought tremendous changes to American Indian identities and ways of life, which in turn influenced their advocacy
efforts. American Indians left the reservations at an unprecedented rate during World War II to join the armed forces or seek jobs supporting the war
effort. 28 As a result, Indians met Indians from other tribes. 29 They slowly
came together to form pan-Indian organizations and encourage advocacy
across tribal lines. 0 These pan-tribal efforts, while not always successful,
reflected an emerging pan-tribal Indian identity." They culminated in the
formation of the National Congress of American Indians ("NCAI"), the oldest existing national pan-Indian organization in 1944.32 In the 1950s, the
NCAI mobilized resistance against the termination policy, which sought to
end the federal government-to-government relationship with Indian tribes
and dissolve the trust status of Indian reservations. 33
The relocation of American Indians to urban centers in the 1950s further facilitated a resurgence in Indian identity and advocacy.M The relocation
program failed to secure steady jobs for Indians but led to the creation of
urban Indian organizations, which further brought Indians from different
tribes together." Federal resources flowed to these new urban centers, and

See, e.g., Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 536-42 (1832).
See, e.g., WiotNs & STARK, supra note 8, at 189-206.
27 For a more in-depth discussion of American Indian political action
in the twentieth
century, see STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE 187-201 (1988).
28 See Stephen Cornell, The New Indian Politics, 10 WIISON Q. 113, 118-19
(1986) [hereinafter "The New Indian Politics"].
29 See id. at 119-20.
o The first pan-Indian organizations emerged in the early twentieth century with the creation of the Society of the American Indian and the National Council of American Indians. See
Dexter Fisher, Zitkala-Sa: The Evolution of a Writer, 5 AM. INDIAN Q. 229, 235 (1979). These
organizations advocated for Indian citizenship, Indian employment in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, equitable settlement of tribal land claims, and legal reforms relating to Indians. See id.;
see also WILKINS & STARK, supra note 8, at 195 (describing the Society of the American
Indian). These organizations no longer exist.
" See, e.g., JOANE NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN ETHIC RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RE25

26

SURGENCE OF IDENTITY AND CUUURE 119-21 (1996).
32 For a discussion of how World War II encouraged tribal advocacy, see Bethany R.
Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate Over Indian Equality, 109 MicH. L. REV. 1463, 1472
(2011).
" See THOMAS W. COWGER, THE NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS: THE

FOUNDING YEARS 3 (1999).
34 See NAGEL, supra note 31, at 119-21 (explaining how relocation increased contact
among American Indians, and thus, identification of common issues and goals).
" See id.
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they generated urban American Indian identities and communities.36 Urban
Indian centers cultivated Indian activism in the early 1960s, as disillusioned
urban Indians founded the American Indian Movement to end police mistreatment.3 7 The red power movement, the American Indian corollary of the
civil rights movement, would emerge out of the early efforts of these urban
Indian centers.
With the advent of the civil rights movement, Indian political activism
continued to grow in the 1960s and 1970s.3 8 Indian tribes persevered in resisting restrictions on their hunting, fishing, and resource rights.3 9 American
Indians also borrowed organizational forms, practices, and rhetoric from the
civil rights movement and tailored them to their own grievances against the
federal government.4 0 American Indian activists reclaimed land by occupying Alcatraz Island, 4 1 marched on Washington, D.C. to reiterate the importance of the United States honoring its treaties, 42 occupied the Bureau of
Indian Affairs ("BIA") building in Washington, D.C. to express dissatisfaction with federal regulation of Indian affairs, 43 and protested during the
standoff at Wounded Knee.44
American Indians also turned to legislative activities in the 1960s, but
these focused primarily on a highly visible campaign for the U.S. government to abandon its policy of terminating tribal governments and assimilating American Indians.45 Congress remained committed to the termination
policy throughout the 1960s.46 The Indian lobby, however, remained weak as
Indian nations had limited financial resources and little experience in federal
policymaking. 47 Historically, tribes had approached Congress to resolve
tribe-specific issues, but significant changes were on the horizon. In the
36 See NAGEL, supra note 31, at 126-27 (describing how an influx of funding from federal
programs "sparked a dramatic growth in urban Indian social, economic, and political
programs").
1

See

CORNELL,

supra note 27, at 189-90.

American Indian political activism predates the civil rights movement. For example,
American Indians in Washington State protested Washington state fishing laws in the early
1950s. See GEORGE PIERRE CASTILE, To SHOw HEART: NATIVE AMERICAN SELF-DETERMINA3

1960-1975 62 (1998).
supra note 27, at 189.

TION AND FEDERAL INDIAN PoLIcY,
'

Id.;

CORNELL,

4 See NAGEL, supra note 31, at 130.
See id. at 131-35.
See id. at 135-37.
43 See id. at 131-37. For a fuller discussion of the emergence of the red power movement,
see id. at 158-86.
* See CORNELL, supra note 27, at 113-15.
45 Some tribes engaged in aggressive lobbying both historically, see Carpenter, supra note
7, and at this time to achieve specific tribal goals. Two examples of successful lobbying efforts
in the late 1960s and early 1970s include the almost seventy-year struggle of the Pueblo of
Taos to restore sacred lands around Blue Lake, CASTILE, supra note 38, at 93, 100-03, and the
Menominee campaign to reverse their termination, id. at 148-52. Castile suggests that these
tribal lobbying efforts encouraged other tribes to pursue their claims against the federal government legislatively. Id. at 100-03.
41

42

' See

CASTILE,

supra note 38, at 21.

The BIA had denied tribes the ability to use their own trust funds to finance lobbying
visits to Washington well into the late 1940s. See CASTILE, supra note 38, at xxv.
47
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1950s and 1960s, with the resurgence in Indian identity and the development
of pan-tribal organizations, tribes started to combine their advocacy efforts
and shift their focus to national level issues. 48 As a result, pan-tribal organizations, led by the NCAI, started taking American Indian concerns directly
to Congress in the 1950s and 1960s. 4 9

Litigation served as another advocacy strategy used by American Indians throughout the twentieth century. 0 Even though they were not always
successful, Indian nations had long resorted to courts as a check on detrimental U.S. policies." In the 1950s, Indian nations litigated and won several
influential cases, which acknowledged their land claims along the East
Coast, 52 recognized their civil jurisdiction,53 and validated their fishing and
hunting rights.5 4 These wins encouraged American Indians to bring more
cases to protect their self-determination, lands, and water rights." As a result, American Indians largely perceived the courts to be friendly to their
interests in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.56 And they were right. The Supreme Court handed down a few worrisome decisions in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, but found in favor of American Indian litigants almost 60 percent of the time from the late 1950s to the late 1980s.1 7
While American Indians have used various advocacy strategies over
time, few studies have tried to document American Indian advocacy systematically." Most political scientists routinely omit American Indians from
" See Berger, supra note 32, at 1472-73.
See The New Indian Politics, supra note 28, at 117-20, 194-95. Castile describes the
Indian lobby in the 1960s as making modest legislative proposals and not having much clout
among members of Congress. See CASTILE, supra note 38, at 19.
50 See CORNELL, supra note 27, at 195.
" See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515 (1832).
52 See Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.
1975).
53
See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
54 See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), af'd, 520 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1975).
" See Lloyd Burton, The American Indian Water Rights Dilemma: HistoricalPerspective
and Dispute-Settling Policy Recommendations, 7 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & PoL'v 1, 39 (1987)
(explaining "until quite recently the tribes have been highly successful in court").
5 See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267 (2001)
(describing the Supreme Court's positive approach to Indian rights in the late 1970s and early
1980s).
1 See Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The CertiorariProcess as a
Barrier to Justicefor Indian Tribes, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 933, 942 (2009).
5 Scholars have produced several case studies on Indian advocacy. See, e.g., MARGARET
D. JACOBS, A GENERATION REMOVED: THE FOSTERING AND ADOPTION OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE POSTWAR WORLD 127-61 (2014) (describing Indian efforts to enact the Indian
Child Welfare Act); Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40
TULSA L. REV. 5, 6, 11-18 (2004) (recounting Indian efforts to enact legislation restoring tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians); Clayton Dumont, Jr., Contesting Scientists'
Narrations of NAGPRA's Legislative History Rule 10.11 and the Recovery of "Culturally
Unidentifiable"Ancestors, 26 WICAZO SA REV. 5, 10 (2011) (discussing the efforts of Indian
nations, pan-tribal organizations, and Native Hawaiians to secure passage of the Native Ameri49
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studies of American politics entirely.5 9 At least one scholar tried to document
changes in collective action by American Indians over time but did not systematically consider legislative strategies largely because Indian nations did
not yet have the resources to pursue them.60
The few other studies on American Indians do not represent the full
range of advocacy strategies utilized by American Indians. These studies
have focused on more limited subjects including voting rights, 61 Indian protest movements after World War H,62 campaign contributions made by Indian
nations involved in gaming enterprises,63 and Indian engagement in state and
local politics."
Of these, a few studies have examined legislative advocacy by American Indians. These studies often frame their research within the theoretical
frameworks used by interest group scholars. 65 They expect, and often find,
that American Indians act like organized interests. 66 Most of these studies
can Graves and Repatriation Act); Patrick Haynal, Termination and Tribal Survival: The Klamath Tribes of Oregon, 101 OR. HIST. Q. 270, 294-96 (2000) (recounting the efforts of the
Klamath tribes of Oregon to regain federal recognition congressionally from 1987 to 1990);
Mark Miller, The Timbisha Shoshone and the NationalPark Idea: Building toward Accommodation and Acknowledgement at Death Valley National Park, 1933-2000, 50 J. SOUTHWEST
415, 434-38 (2008) (describing the successful efforts of the Timbisha Shoshone to obtain
legislation providing them with homeland from 1994 to 2000). Some scholars have also included short descriptions of Indian legislative advocacy on a particular bill in articles focused
on the bill and how it changed the law. See, e.g., Judith Royster, Mineral Development in
Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA. L.J. 541,
582-84 (1993) (describing the tribal dissatisfaction with mineral leasing on Indian lands leading up to the enactment of the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982).
5 See generally WILKINS & STARK, supra note 8; Jeff J. Comtassel & Richard C. Witmer,
II, American Indian Tribal Government Support of Office-Seekers: Findings from the 1994
Election, 34 Soc. Sci. J. 511 (1997).
'See The New Indian Politics, supra note 28, at 116-31.
6! See generally DANIEL MCCOOL, ET AL., NATIVE VOTE: AMERICAN INDIANS, THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIG-T TO VOTE (2007); LAUGHLIN McDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS
AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS (2011).
62 See generally DANIEL COBB, NATIVE ACTIvism IN COLD WAR AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE
FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2008); PAUL CHAAT SMITH & ROBERT ALLEN WARRIOR, LIKE A HURRICANE: THE INDIAN MOVEMENT FROM ALCATRAZ TO WOUNDED KNEE (1997); JOANE NAGEL,
AMERICAN INDIAN ETHNiC RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF IDENTITY AND

CULTURE

(1996).

See generally Fredrick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Indian Nations as Interest
Groups: Tribal Motivations for Contributions to U.S. Senators, 65 POL. RES. Q. 179 (2012);
Corntassel & Witmer, supra note 59.
' See generally LAURA E. EVANS, POWER FROM POWERLESSNESS: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS,
INSTrI-UTIONAL NICHES, AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2011); MASON, supra note 7; K.N. HANSEN & T.A. SKOPEK, THE NEW POLITICS OF INDIAN GAMING: THE RISE OF RESERVATION INTEREST GROUPS (2011); Fredrick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, State Lobbying Registrationsby
Native American Tribes, 2015 Po., GROUPS & IDENT-ls 2 (2015); JEFF CORNTASSEL
RICHARD C. WITMER II, FORCED FEDERALISM: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS
NATIONHOOD (2008).
6 See HANSEN & SKOPEK, supra note 64, at 14-16; Boehmke & Witmer, supra note 64, at
5; Richard Witmer & Frederick J. Boehmke, American Indian Political Incorporationin the
Post-Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Era, 44 Soc. ScI. J. 127, 129 (2007).
' See Boehmke & Witmer, supra note 64, at 5; Witmer & Boehmke, supra note 65, at
129.
&
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have documented the increased use of interest group strategies, especially
lobbying and campaign contributions, by Indian tribes at the federal, state,
and local levels.

67

Professors Witmer and Boehmke conducted the most comprehensive
study to date on legislative advocacy by Indians at the federal level. They
reported an increase in federal lobbying expenditures made by American
Indians from 1997 to 2000.68 Witmer and Boehmke argued that resource
constraints limited American Indians' potential for legislative advocacy historically and that gaming has altered that constraint since the late 1980s. 69
They concluded that gaming has provided opportunities in terms of resources for tribes to increase their lobbying activities.70 The insights from the
study, however, are limited because of its narrow focus on the influence of
one factor (gaming), and its short time frame (only three years). Due to the
short time frame of their analysis, they do not really compare American
Indian legislative advocacy before and after the rise of gaming and thus cannot assess fully how gaming may have altered lobbying. 71
To my knowledge, only one other study has considered American Indian lobbying activities on the federal level.7 2 A recent study investigated

lobbying strategies employed by Indian groups seeking federal recognition
from 1977 to 2012.71 It demonstrated that the political context helped to

shape Indian groups' advocacy strategies over time. 74 While it analyzed a
longer time period than Witmer and Boehmke, the study was more limited in
scope in that it only analyzed lobbying by non-federally recognized Indian
groups. As a result, the findings may be limited only to that subset of Indian
groups.
Similarly, scholars have yet to systematically study the use of litigation
strategies by American Indians. Several scholars have tried to determine
how successfully tribes have litigated before the U.S. Supreme Court over
time,"7 but I have yet to identify a study that looks at how frequently tribes
litigate in federal, tribal, or state courts.
67 See HANSEN & SKOPEK, supra note 64, at 211-13; Boehmke & Witmer,
supra note 64,
at 134-35; Corntassel & Witmer, supra note 59, at 2, 7-8; see also Boehmke & Witmer, supra
note 63, at 179, 181; Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Making Strategic Choices: How and Why Indian
Groups Advocated for Federal Recognition from 1977 to 2012, 51 LAW & Soc'v REV. 930,
942-45 (2017).
66" Witmer & Boehmke, supra note 65, at 134-35.
Id. at 130-31.
70
Id. at 140.
" Id. at 130-31. They include a short description of American Indian legislative advocacy
prior to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, but they do not include any quantitative data on
reported lobbying or contributions by American Indians before 1988. Id.
72 See generally Carlson, supra note 67 (investigating the advocacy strategies of 124 Indian groups seeking federal recognition from 1977 to 2012).
" See generally id.
74
Id. at 945-51.
" See generally Bethany Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court? Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General., and Beyond, 2017 ILL. L. REV. 1901
(2017); Fletcher, supra note 57; Getches, supra note 56; Alexander Tallchief Skibine, The
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The dearth of studies on Indian advocacy indicates an acute need for
more research on Indian advocacy strategies and how they have developed
over time. It motivated the study on reported lobbying by American Indians
described in the next section.
B.

The Study

This study is a first step towards developing more comprehensive
knowledge about American Indian advocacy strategies. It seeks to describe
reported lobbying by American Indians from 1978 to 2012 and to start to fill
some of the gaps in the existing literature on American Indian advocacy.
1.

Data Collection

I accessed primary data on lobbying by American Indians from several
sources, including serial publications and lobbying disclosure reports, publically available and archival materials on legislation introduced in Congress
from 1975 to 2012, and interviews with lobbyists for American Indian nations and organizations. I collected data on reported lobbying by American
Indians from serial publications and lobbying disclosure reports. 76 For the
years 1978 to 1996, data on Indian organizations and tribes reporting the
lobbying of federal officials was collected from the serial publication Washington Representatives.77 After 1996, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995
required lobbyists to register with the House or Senate and report regularly
the name of the registrant, the name of the client, the amount spent on lobbying, the issue areas in which they lobbied, and the specific bills and regula-

Supreme Court's Last 30 Years of Federal Indian Law: Looking for Equilibrium or
Supremacy?, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 277 (2018).
7 I wanted to collect data starting in 1975 so that it would coincide with the adoption of
the Tribal Self-Determination Policy by Congress and with a related database on Indian-related
federal legislation. I chose to use 1978 as the baseline year instead, after reviewing several
serial publications and determining that it was the first year for which I could find consistent
and reliable data.
7 My use of serial publications is consistent with other interest group studies. See generally JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC
INTEREST GROUPS (1977); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOTZMAN & JOHN I. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986). 1 identified tribes and Indian organizations with
lobbyists by searching the subject matter index. For the years 1978-1992, 1 used the subject
matter category "minorities" to identify Indian tribes and organizations (none of the other
subject matter indices seemed relevant). For 1993-1996, I used both the "minorities" and "Native American" subject matter categories. Most of the tribes and Indian organizations were
identifiable by name, but occasionally, I looked up an entity online. If I could not tell if an
organization was made up of American Indians and advocated for their benefit, I did not
include it on the list. I excluded charitable organizations that appeared to be non-Indian friends
of the Indians, such as the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions.
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tions on which they lobbied.78 For the years 1997 to 2012, data was collected
from the Open Secrets website run by the Center for Responsive Politics. 7 9
To facilitate comparative analysis over time, data was collected on the
name of the organization or tribe reporting lobbying; the years and congressional sessions in which each reported lobbying; the issue areas in which
they lobbied; and the lobbyists, if any hired by the organization or tribe; and
the years it used a specific lobbyist. 0 Organizations had to start reporting
lobbying expenditures in 1997, and data was collected on the amount of
money each organization reported spending on lobbying by year and congressional session beginning in that year. Additional data was collected from
publically available sources on the geographical location of each Indian tribe
that reported lobbying during the time period studied and whether the tribe
engaged in gaming during the years they reported lobbying.'
2.

Methodology

This study investigates the use of lobbying strategies by American Indian nations and organizations from 1978 to 2012. It is the first to use empirical methods to look systematically at reported lobbying and lobbying
expenditures by American Indians over a thirty-five year time period. This
time period allows for the identification and comparison of trends in reported lobbying and lobbying expenditures over time.
I use quantitative methods to describe and compare reported lobbying
and reported lobbying expenditures by American Indian organizations and
tribes from 1978 to 2012. Drawing on the few existing studies of Indian
legislative activity and the general trend towards increased lobbying by
groups over time, I expected to find an increase in reported lobbying and
reported lobbying expenditures by Indians over time. I investigated this expectation by looking at the frequencies of reported lobbying and reported
lobbying expenditures by American Indians nation and organizations and
comparing them over time. I collected and analyzed additional data on gaming, the issues Indians lobbied on, and geography to provide context and a
broader understanding of trends in Indian lobbying behavior. I supplemented
this quantitative analysis with archival research and interviews with lobby78 2 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012). The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 required biannual reporting. It was amended in 2008 to require quarterly reporting. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C and 18 U.S.C.).
7 I used the "Indian/Native American Affairs" issues index to identify tribes and tribal
organizations lobbying before Congress in a given year from the Open Secrets website. OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org [https://perma.cc/QH9D-ZAAF] (last visited Nov.
4, 2018). I then cross-referenced this list with the "Gaming" issues index.
' Data was not collected on the specific bill or regulations on which the lobbyist lobbied
because this information was often either missing or unreliable.
s1 This information was collected from tribal websites and TILLER'S GUIDE TO INDIAN
COUNTRY: ECONOMIC PROFILES OF AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS (Veronica E. Velarde
Tiller ed., 2006).
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ists both to substantiate my findings and to determine qualitative changes to
lobbying behaviors.
3.

Limits to the Study

Several limits exist to this study. First, the data only represents American Indian organizations and tribes that reported lobbying from 1978 to 2012
and reported lobbying expenditures from 1997 to 2012. They may underrepresent lobbying and lobbying expenditures by American Indian organizations and tribes for several reasons. First, the Lobbying bisclosure Act only
requires the reporting of direct lobbying not indirect or grassroots lobbying.
Second, some organizations and tribes may not have reported lobbying prior
to 1995.82 Third, after 1995, some organizations and tribes may not have
conducted enough lobbying to report their activities under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 or may have chosen not to do so." Fourth, after 1997,
some organizations and tribes may not have spent enough money on lobbying expenditures to report their activities. The underreporting of lobbying
and lobbying expenditures raises concerns that the data may underrepresent
actual lobbying by American Indian nations and organizations.
The benefit of the data presented here (even if imperfect) is that it
presents a much broader and more systematic view of reported lobbying and
lobbying expenditures by American Indians over time. The study spans
thirty-five years-a much longer time period than previous studies of lobbying by American Indians at the federal level-and thus, allows for the identification of trends and changes in lobbying behaviors over time. Moreover, it
includes the collection and analysis of data on reported lobbying and lobbying expenditures by American Indians both before and after the rise of Indian gaming. This allows for important comparative analysis over time,
missing from earlier studies. 4
A second limit to this study is that it does not attempt to evaluate the
effects of American Indian lobbying. While that question is important and
merits close investigation, this study has a more limited purpose. It seeks to
investigate and explain changes in lobbying trends over time.

82

Several scholars have noted possible inaccuracies in data reported by lobbyists. See,

e.g., WrLUAM N. ESKRIDGE, ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 198-200

(2d ed. 2006); Timothy M. LaPira, Lobbying in the Shadows: How Private Interests Hide from
Public Scrutiny and Why That Matters, in INTEREST GROUP PoLrnes 224, 238-40 (9th ed.
Allan J. Cigler, et al. eds., 2016). Congress first started requiring lobbyists to register in the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, but many interest groups may have felt that they
did not have to register after the Supreme Court seriously limited the Act's application in 1954
in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 619 (1954). ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra, at 201. Lobbying registrations increased after enactment of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. Id. But
they have recently dropped. LaPira, supra, at 238-40. For a discussion of the limits of data
collected under the Lobbying Registration Act, see LaPira, supra, at 233-39.
" LaPira, supra note 82, at 224-26, 238-39 (noting some of the reasons why lobbyists do
not report their lobbying activities).
I Witmer & Boehmke, supra note 65, at 132.
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Third, this article evaluates strategic decisionmaking on a macro rather
than a microlevel. It describes trends in lobbying over time but has not attempted to disaggregate or analyze the data on an individual, tribal level.
Thus, it cannot explain any particular tribe or Indian organization's decision
to lobby on a specific issue at a given moment in time. Similarly, the analysis cannot directly compare strategy choices or why an Indian tribe or organization decided to lobby rather than, or in addition to, litigating any
particular issue. 5 The article attempts to situate the increase in lobbying by
American Indians generally with trends in litigation by American Indians
but acknowledges the limits of doing so given the lack of data on how frequently American Indian tribes and organizations engage in litigation. 6
Another limit to the study is that it only measures changes in legislative
advocacy from 1978 onward. Due to the difficulty of collecting data, I can
only compare lobbying starting in 1978 and lobbying expenditures starting
in 1997. This date is somewhat arbitrary because historical studies and accounts document Indian legislative advocacy from contact. These historical
studies suggest that my data are part of a larger, ongoing narrative of Indian
advocacy. 7 Unfortunately, I have yet to find a way to measure systematically such advocacy efforts.
I.

CHANGING STRATEGIES: THE RISE OF AMERICAN INDIAN
LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY

American Indian advocacy started to change dramatically in the 1970s
as American Indians increasingly engaged in legislative strategies. This shift
continued over the next thirty-five years with American Indian legislative
advocacy growing significantly from 1978 to 2012.
Six times as many American Indian organized interests reported lobbying in 2012 as in 1978.8 Figure 1 depicts the frequency of reported lobbying
" For examples of this kind of microlevel analysis of group decisionmaking, see, e.g.,
Carlson, supra note 72; Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 11.
"6 See supra Part II.
87 See generally HoxmF, supra note 3; HERMANN J. VIOLA, DIPLoMATs
IN BUCKSIGNs: A
HISTORY OF INDIAN DELEGATION IN WASHINGTON CITY (1995); The New Indian Politics, supra
note 28.
" Thirty-six American Indian organizations, including tribes, reported lobbying in 1978
and 242 in 2012, an increase of over 600 percent (36/242). The numbers are even more startling for tribes: 24 tribes reported lobbying in 1978 and 177 in 2012. This is an over 700
percent (24/177) increase in the number of tribes lobbying (and 2012 does not even represent
the highpoint for tribes reporting lobbying over this time period). While lobbying rates have
generally increased over the past five decades, it is hard to compare the increase in American
Indian lobbying with other groups due to differences in variables and measurements. Leech et
al. included Indian affairs as an issue area, but they only reported the average number of
interest groups per issue area and the average number of lobbyists per issue area over a fouryear period (1996-2000), and they did not break down the numbers by year. Leech, et al.,
supra note 11, at 24-25. According to their data, very few interest groups lobbied on Indian
affairs in comparison with other issue areas. Id. at 24. They did not, however, explain whether
they included Indian tribes as interest groups in their data set. Moreover, they reported that the
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over time by American Indian interest organizations, including Indian nations, tribal consortiums, American Indian non-profit organizations, Alaska
Native for- and non-profits under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
Alaska Native villages, and Native Hawaiian groups. Political scientists have
documented a similar rise in lobbying, but these numbers exceed the increases in reported lobbying found by political scientists studying the general population. For example, in 2004, Professors Loomis and Schiller noted
that "registered lobbyists rose in numbers from . . . almost 6000 in 1981 to
an astonishing 20,000 in 2002"-an increase of over 300 percent. 9 Recent
studies, however, have documented a decline in lobbying after 2007.0
350
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Figure 1. American Indian organizations, including Indian nations, reporting lobbying

over time, 1978-2012.
Of the American Indian interest organizations reporting lobbying during this time, Indian nations filed the vast majority, 71 percent, of the reports. 9 ' Figure 2 displays reported lobbying by Indian nations over time.
92
Over half-a total of 325 Indian nations or 57.4 percent of the 566 federaverage number of contract lobbyists hired in Indian affairs exceeded that of the majority of
issue areas. Id. at 25.
" Loomis & SCHILLER, supra note 11, at 38. Loomis and Schiller reported an even greater
400 percent increase in the number of Washington-based interest representatives (from 4,000
in 1977 to about 17,000 in 2002). Id. They also noted that the rise in interest group advocacy
has not been spread evenly across groups. Id.
'See, e.g., LaPira, supra note 82, at 240 fig.1.
" I generated this number by dividing the number of tribes filing reports by the total
number of reports filed by American Indian organizations from 1978 to 2012. American Indian
organizations filed a total of 5,111 annual reports from 1978 to 2012, but some of these organizations filled more than one report. Indian nations filed 3,646 of these reports.
92 I generated this percentage by dividing 325 by 566. It does not accurately represent the
actual percentage because the number of tribes increased rather than remained constant over
the time period studied. As a result, the actual percentage may be lower.
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ally recognized tribes in the United States at the time-reported lobbying at
least once during this time period. While the overall trend for Indian nations
indicates a 700 percent increase in the number of tribes lobbying, it has
varied some over time.93 Reported lobbying by tribes rose dramatically in the
late 1970s, leveled off in the early 1980s, and then grew significantly from
1984 to 1986 before dipping slightly in the late 1980s. From 1990 to 1995,
the number of tribes reporting lobbying steadily increased again. It declined
in the late 1990s, surged in the early 2000s, decreased with the economic
recession of 2008, and appears to be rebounding in the past few years.9 4
250
200
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100
50

/00,
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Figure 2. Indian nations reporting lobbying over time, 1978-2012.

Not all Indian nations reported lobbying during this time period. In fact,
43.7 percent of federally recognized Indian nations did not report lobbying
at all during the time period studied.
The tribes that did report lobbying varied in the frequency of their lobbying. Some tribes reported lobbying almost every year, such as the Makah
Indian Tribe and Quinault Indian Nation, while others reported lobbying
only once or twice during the time period studied.95 On average, tribes re9 I generated this number by dividing the number of tribes reporting lobbying in 1978 by
the number reporting lobbying in 2012. Twenty-four tribes reported lobbying in 1978 and 177
in 2012.
9 I have not tried to explain these variations in the lobbying pattern. Several factors could
influence fluctuations in individual tribal decisions to lobby, including the growth of gaming in
the early 1990s and changes in party alignments in Congress and the Executive Branch. In
contrast, reported lobbying in general has been decreasing since 2007. LaPira, supra note 82,
at 240 fig.1.
" Other Indian nations that report lobbying frequently include, but are not limited to, the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, the Tulalip Tribes of Washington, the Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation, the Navajo Nation, the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, the
Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, the Lummi Indian Nation, and the Hoopa Valley Tribe. It is
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ported lobbying during 11 of the 34 years in the data set. A quarter of tribes,
however, reported lobbying during five years or less, and another quarter
reported lobbying for 18 years or more. 96
As Figure 3 shows, very few of the tribes that reported lobbying were
engaged in gaming prior to 1991. The number of Indian nations engaged in
gaming and reporting lobbying increased dramatically over the time period
studied as more tribes opened gaming operations in the mid-1990s. Indian
nations engaged in gaming exceeded non-gaming Indian nations in reporting
lobbying for the first time in 1995-the same year that most of the tribes in
the dataset started gaming operations. Gaming tribes have outnumbered nongaming tribes in reported lobbying every year since then. Over the entire
time period studied, the majority-60 percent-of the Indian nations that
reported lobbying operated gaming establishments at the time they reported
lobbying. 97
160
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Figure 3. Reported lobbying by gaming and non-gaming tribes over time, 1978-2012.

Both gaming and non-gaming Indian nations reported more lobbying
over time. As Figure 3 shows, reported lobbying by gaming and non-gaming
not clear whether this variation is a function of the reporting requirements or whether it reflects actual variation among the advocacy strategies used by Indian nations.
' In terms of congressional sessions, on average, tribes reported lobbying six congressional sessions. A quarter of tribes reported lobbying three or fewer congressional sessions,
and a quarter reported lobbying nine or more congressional sessions.
" The median year that tribes in the dataset started gaming was 1995. A tribe was coded
as operating a gaming establishment if it engaged in gaming the year(s) in which it reported
lobbying. To code tribes as gaming or non-gaming, data was collected from public sources
(e.g., Tiller's Guide, tribal websites, etc.). Tribes were coded as gaming for years in which they
operated a gaming establishment and as non-gaming for years in which they did not.
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tribes has followed the same trend line-lobbying by both dipped in the late
1990s and then rebounded. The rate in reported lobbying for gaming tribes,
however, has increased more steadily and by a larger amount over time than
the rate increase for non-gaming tribes.98
The amount of money American Indian organizations reported spending on lobbying has fluctuated more than reported lobbying but overall supports a trend toward increased legislative advocacy during the past thirtyfive years. Figure 4 reports the amount of money spent on lobbying by
American Indian organizations over time, starting in 1997 (the first year in
which the amount spent is available). 99 In nine of the fifteen years for which
data is available, reported lobbying expenditures by American Indian organizations increased.
Unlike reported lobbying, the money spent by American Indian organizations did not consistently increase over time. In this respect, reported lobbying expenditures by American Indians do not mirror trends in reported
lobbying expenditures in the U.S. population generally. Recent studies show
that reported lobbying expenditures increased from 1998 to 2010.100
American Indian organizations reported spending a particularly high
amount in 1999, but then spending leveled off at a much lower level until
2004 when it decreased dramatically. 0' The most significant decrease, however, occurred in 2005. Since 2010, reported spending has increased inconsistently, but appears to be on the rise generally. Most likely the decrease in
reported lobbying expenditures from 2005 to 2010 responded to the
Abramoff lobbying scandal that broke in 2006 and revealed that lobbyists
had swindled Indian tribes out of millions of dollars.'0 It may also have
reflected the economic downturn. The inconsistencies in reported lobbying
expenditures by American Indians could also indicate that money is a less
consistent resource for tribes, that effective lobbying costs less, or that tribes
rely more on lobbying by tribal members or in-house counsel.

.

9 Reported lobbying by non-gaming tribes has always been more variable than for gaming tribes. This may reflect the fewer resources that non-gaming tribes have to spend on lobbying and choices that they make in prioritizing what issues to lobby on and when.
9 Like the lobbying data, these numbers only include reported spending. They may underrepresent the amount spent on lobbying by American Indian organizations as some may
choose to lobby on their own behalf or not conduct enough lobbying to report such activities
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.
"n LaPira, supra note 82, at 240 fig. I (noting that reported lobbying expenditures have
increased in general from 1998 to 2010 and then decreased from 2010 to 2013).
101 I have not tried to investigate the reasons for this dip in lobbying after 1999. This dip is
not reflected in data on reported lobbying among the general population. Reported lobbying
continued to increase during the late 1990s. LaPira, supra note 82, at 240 fig.
102 See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 8, at 168-69.
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Figure 4. Amount of money spent on lobbying by American Indian organizations over

time, 1997-2012.
American Indian organizations reported spending on average $94,411 a
year with a median of $40,000.103 A quarter of all organizations did not report spending any money on lobbying.io4 Another quarter reported spending
over $112,000 with the top spender (an Indian tribe) reporting spending
$3,205,000 in a single year.
Indian nations reported spending significant amounts of money on lobbying and more than American Indian orgamizations mn general. On average,
Indian nations spent $109,408 on lobbying per year, but this number conceals significant variation among tribes. A quarter of all tribes did not report
spending any money on lobbying. Half of all tribes reported spending between $40,000 and $120,000. Another quarter reported spending $120,000
or more. The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians topped the list of high
spenders and repor-ted spending over $3 million in 1999. While a few tribes
annually reported spending over $200,000 a year on lobbying, 1o5 most did
"o While the mean is $94,411, there is a large standard deviation (201.644). Here, American Indian organizations include Indian nations.
" Tribal consortiums reported the lowest levels of spending of the American Indian
organizations.
"'Tribes consistently reporting spending over $200,000 annually on lobbying include the
Agua Caliente Band of Cabuilla Indians, the Jicarilla Apache Nation, the Gila River Indian
Community, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, the Oneida Indian Nation, the Pechanga Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, the Seminole
Tribe of Florida, the Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana, and the Viejas Band of Kumeyaay
Indians.
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not consistently report spending high amounts of money on lobbying but
tended to increase spending in a particular year. For example, the Osage
Nation reported spending over $2 million dollars in 2011 but returned to its
much lower regular spending level (under $100,000) in 2012. Such variations in spending most likely reflect changing tribal priorities.
Indian nations engaged in gaming reported spending more on lobbying
than non-gaming tribes. 06 On average, gaming tribes reported spending
twice as much-almost $135,000-on lobbying per year as Indian nations
not engaged in gaming, which reported spending only $51,500 on lobbying
per year. 107
Consistent with earlier studies on lobbying by American Indians on the
state and federal levels, 0 the evidence on reported lobbying and lobbying
expenditures shows that American Indians increased their lobbying in the
1970s even though they had not overcome the constraints the prevailing narrative suggests should have prevented them from lobbying.'0 Anecdotal evidence from secondary sources, archival research, and interviews with Indian
law advocates confirm these findings." 0 In addition to reporting lobbying
and expenditures, Indian tribes started opening offices in Washington, D.C.
to support their lobbying efforts in the 1980s."' Tribal organizations, including the National Tribal Chairman's Association and the NCAI, launched a
major initiative to defeat anti-Indian legislation in the late 1970s and have
continued to closely monitor legislation ever since. Indian tribes have also
testified extensively before Congress since the early 1970s.11 2
American Indians had neither gained in electoral significance nor become less impoverished when they increased their lobbying efforts in the

'
ANOVA tests indicate that this difference in spending between gaming and non-gaming tribes is significant at the 0.00 level.
107 The median amount of money reported as spent on lobbying was significantly
less for
both gaming and non-gaming tribes. The median amount reported as spent by gaming tribes
was $60,000 per year and $20,000 per year for non-gaming tribes.
10 See supra Part II.
'
See supra fig.2.
110I conducted research on Indian-related bills with files retained by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs and the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs at the Center for
Legislative Archives. I also reviewed files on or related to legislation in the National Congress
of American Indians archives (1933-1990) at the Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian Archives Center.
...
About the Navajo Nation, NAVAJO NATION WASH. OFFICE, http://www.nnwo.org\con
tent\about-navajo-nation [http://perma.cc/HJ5B-N2Y5] (last visited Nov. 4, 2018) (explaining
that the office opened in 1984).
1 2
1
See, e.g., 1981-82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 1298, S. 2197, and S.
2498 Before the S. Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management, 97th Cong. 86-90 (1982)
(statement of Barry E. Snyder, President, Seneca Nation of Indians of New York); Hearing on
Miscellaneous Minor Tax Bills Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 21-27
(1976) (statement of Richard Schifter); Hearing on Misc. Tax Bills Before the H. Subcomm. on
Misc. Revenue Measures, 95th Cong. 107-26 (1977) (statement of William E. Sudow); see
also Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Tribes Lobbying Congress: Who Wins and Why 7-9 (2016) (draft
report presented at the 13th Annual Indigenous Law Conference, Mich. State Univ.) https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3043226 [https://perma.cclU82Z-BDQ7].
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1970s. In fact, American Indians remain largely electorally insignificant to
this day.I" While gaming eventually introduced new financial resources that
tribes could use on lobbying, the data demonstrate that most tribes did not
start gaming operations until 1995-almost two decades after American Indians initially increased their lobbying efforts. Contrary to the view expressed in popular culture, the media, and some scholarship,' 14 Indian
gaming could not have caused the dramatic increase in the lobbying of federal officials by American Indians over the past thirty-five years. Rather, the
data show that American Indians have been gaining momentum as lobbyists
over time. Gaming appears to have encouraged and reinforced the use of
legislative strategies by American Indians at the end of the twentieth century, but it was not the primary or only influence leading to it and lobbying
expenditures have not consistently increased over time with the advent of
gaming. Moreover, American Indians chose to engage in legislative advocacy even as their claims continued to be recognized and validated by the
Supreme Court."' American Indians turned to lobbying even when the odds

113

American Indians rarely affect electoral outcomes because they do not comprise a ma-

jority population in any state, TINA NoRRIs, PAULA L. VINEs, & ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIvE POPULATION: 2010 6-7 (Jan.
2012) (noting that California has the highest percentage of Indians living in any state at 14
percent), and constitute a majority in only one or two congressional districts. See MCCooL Er
AL., supra note 61, at 176-91 (noting the few instances in which Native voters may have made
a difference in elections in Western swing states); TOVA WANG, DEMOS, ENSURING ACCESS TO
THE BALLOT FOR AMERICAN INDIANS & NATIVES: NEW SOLUTIONS TO STRENGTHEN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 3 (2012) http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/IHS%2OReportDemos.pdf [http://perma.cc/SB2N-V2CJ] (reporting low voter turnout rates among American
Indians). Indian issues rarely, if ever, decide congressional elections. See MCCOOL ET AL.,
supra note 61, at 176-91. The issues that American Indians care about are not highly salient to
the general public and are not among the issues upon which most non-Indian constituents base
their voting decisions. See, e.g., Owen G. Abbe et al., Agenda Setting in CongressionalElections: The Impact of Issues and Campaigns on Voting Behavior, 56 POL. REs. Q. 419, 422
(2003) (identifying education, social security, health care, and the economy as the most important issues in the 1998 House Elections). Public opinion polls also routinely find that Americans do not rank Indian issues as important. See, e.g., Most Important Problem, GALLUP,
[http://perma.cc/AC7Zhttp://www.gallup.com/poll/1675/most-important-problem.aspx
MUKB] (last visited Nov. 4, 2018). To the extent that non-Indians care about Indian issues, it
may jeopardize a member of Congress's reelection due to an increased backlash movement
against Indians in recent decades. See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 8, at xxx-xxxi, 169.
Thus, as a collection of election-minded politicians (rather than conscientious lawmakers),
members of Congress have few incentives to pay attention to Indian issues. See CHARLES C.
TURNER, THE POLITICS OF MINOR CONCERNS: AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY AND CONGRESSIONAL
DYNAMICS 130-33 (2005). More often than not, politicians may gain political support from
non-Indians by disfavoring Indian interests. See, e.g., CASTILE, supra note 38, at 166-68
(describing how Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) and Congressman Lloyd Meeds (D-Wash.)
waivered in their support for tribal self-determination due to fishing rights controversies in
Washington state). Financially, most Indian nations and individuals have historically been impoverished and unable to contribute to electoral campaigns. See Boehmke & Witmer, supra
note 63, at 179, 181 (stating that prior to gaming, tribes previously did not have financial
resources to participate politically).
114 See, e.g., House of Cards, Chapter 21 (Netflix 2014). For a discussion of the scholarly
literature on gaming and lobbying see infra Part IV.A.
"' See supra Part H.A.
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seemed to be against them. This reality suggests that the prevailing narrative
does not fully explain the rise in American Indian advocacy. The next Part
reviews the interest group and sociolegal literatures in search of a more accurate explanation of how groups craft advocacy strategies.

IV.

INTEREST GROUP AND SOCIOLEGAL APPROACHES TO
UNDERSTANDING

ADVOCACY

The dramatic rise in American Indian legislative advocacy raises an
important question: What compels groups to engage in some advocacy strategies but not others? In this Part, I evaluate the interest group and sociolegal
approaches to understanding why groups pursue different advocacy
strategies.
A.

Interest Group Approach

Interest group scholars study lobbying." 6 Their primary focus has been
on why groups lobby legislatures."' They have paid significantly less attention to the lobbying of other institutions and have only recently begun to
consider how venue choice affects lobbying decisions."' Groups lobby legislatures to attain a particular policy goal,"'9 but the tactics and strategies available to them are constrained by external conditions, including their political

6See e.g., ANTHONY J. NOWNES, ToTAL
THEY TRY TO GET I-) 5 (2006).
"See,

LOBBYING: WHAT LOBBYISTS WANT (AND How

e.g., JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING

INTEREST

GROUPS IN AMERICA (1991);

BERRY, supra note 77; SCHLOTZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 77. Interest group scholars, however, have not agreed on how to define lobbying. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANCE: WHO WINS, WHO LoSES, AND WHY 33 (2009). For a discussion of the varying
definitions see id. Within political science and sociology, a broad literature exists on why
groups mobilize. See generally MANCUR OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GooDS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971); JACK L. WALKER, JR., supra; Robert H. Salis-

bury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1 (1969); Jack L.
Walker, Jr., The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 390 (1983). I am less interested in group formation and more interested in the decisions
groups make to engage in certain kinds of advocacy strategies. In terms of McCann's four
stages of movement development, I am interested in the second stage, "reform policy negotiation between movement activists and the state or other elites" rather than the first stage, "the
movement building process." Michael McCann, Legal Mobilization and Social Reform Movements: Notes on Theory and Its Application, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY II 231

(1991).
"'See generally Thomas T. Holyoake, Choosing Battlegrounds: Interest Group Lobbying
Across Multiple Venues, 56 POL. REs. Q. 325 (2003); Amy Melissa McKay, The Decision to
Lobby Bureaucrats, 147 PUB. CHOICE 123 (2011); Bryan S. McQuide, Interest Groups, Political Institutions and Strategic Choice: What Influences Institutional Lobbying Strategies? 5-6
(Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Annual Meeting Paper, Sept. 2010), http://ssm.com\abstract= 1642311
[http://perma.cc/9L8F-7AZJ].
"'See generally David Lowery, Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal,
Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying, 39 POLITY 29 (2007).
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capacity and resources, the political context, and active opposition by other
advocates or policymakers. 120
Interest group scholars have defined different aspects of these external
conditions. Political capacity refers to the characteristics of the group, including its access to policymakers,121 its electoral influence, 122 and the kind
of claims it makes.1 23 Resources include the number of members in a group,
the degree to which the public supports the initiative, the group's financial
resources, the number of other organizations allying with the group, and the
number of staff (including in-house lobbyists).1 24 The political context includes issue salience, party control of government, and support of political
elites but rarely institutional alternatives to lobbying a legislature.1 25 Opposition means active opposition by others, such as blocking legislative action or
mobilizing a countermovement. It may come from other organized interests,
administration officials, members of important committees in Congress,
other members of Congress, or unorganized individuals.1 2 6
Interest group studies have sought to determine the relationships among
these variables and lobbying activities. A few studies have determined that
some of these factors influence lobbyists' institutional choices.1 27 Groups
with political capacity, including electoral influence and access to policy'

20

121
122

See BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 117, at 110-11.

Holyoake, supra note 118, at 333-34.
For an in-depth study of how electoral concerns shape legislators' policymaking deci-

sions see generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LoGic OF CONGRESSIONAL ACrION (1990).
" See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 82, at 62. Political scientists have found that groups

seeking to challenge the status quo are more likely to mobilize than groups seeking to defend
the status quo. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 117, at 164 ("In general, supporters of the
status quo need to do much less than do status quo challengers."). Status quo defenders may
adopt a watchful approach and choose not to mobilize unless they feel they have to. See id. at
57-58, 152-53. They may only mobilize if the issue gains attention and merits a response. In
contrast, status quo challengers may have to use legislative advocacy to increase attention to
the issue to get policymakers to act on it. See id. at 147, 164.
124 BAUMGARTNER Er AL., supra note 117, at 194.
" McQuide, supra note 118, at 12-13 (measuring the political environment by looking at
issue salience, party in control of government, presidential party, issue conflict, stage of the
President's term, and presidential agenda priority); Baumgarter, et al., supra note 11, at 13
(measuring government activities in terms of congressional hearings, federal spending, and
presidential attention to an issue).
"2 Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 28
UCLA L. REV. 1617, 1624 (2011). Some political scientists have defined opposition more
broadly to consider other obstacles in the policy making process, including a lack of interest,
effort, support, concern or attention from policy makers. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note
117, at 78. They have considered the influence of active opposition on policymaking and find
that it is not a predictor of policy success or failure. See id. at 76. Some scholars have considered active opposition in their studies of American Indian politics. In their study of contemporary challenges to indigenous nationhood, Corntassel and Witmer identify opposition or
backlash, and particularly backlash based on misperceptions of American Indian nations and
their people as one of, if not the, greatest threat to Indian nations today. CORNTASSEL & WrrMER, supra note 64, at 3-6, 24-28. Their study focused on state-tribal interactions and indicated that these misperceptions have motivated state officials to oppose tribal initiatives and
that Indian nations have responded by mobilizing politically on the state level. Id. at 6.
12 See generally Holyoake, supra note 118, at 325; McKay, supra note 118, at 123; McQuide, supra note 118, at 5-6.
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makers, are more likely to engage in legislative advocacy.' 28 Similarly, political scientists have found that higher levels of resources, including
personnel, allies, and money, increase the likelihood that a group will lobby
a specific institution or across multiple institutions. 12 9
Studies have shown that a positive external political context fosters lobbying. Lobbying may increase during divided partisan government as it provides more opportunities to lobby against proposed policy changes.'3 0 The
support of political elites also encourages lobbying activities.13 ' Several
forms of political support motivate groups to lobby, including congressional
hearings, federal spending, and presidential attention to an issue. 3 2 In response to increased levels of federal activities, affected interests lobby to
fight off new federal incursions, encourage the activity, or attempt to modify
the proposals before they are complete.'
Scholars have found opposition to both encourage and discourage lobbying. While some suggest that opposition may deter political mobilization,
at least one study argues that "[c]onflict seems to propel groups into political activity." 3 4 Other scholars have noted that by challenging the status quo,
groups encourage mobilization by opponents.' This oppositional organization, however, may help draw attention to the issue, and thus, benefit the

128 See Holyoake, supra note 118, at 333-34. Political scientists have consistently
found
that groups lobby their allies or legislators that are already friendly to their causes. See, e.g.,
Ken Kollman, Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional
Committees, 41 AM. Poi. Sci. REv. 519, 519 (1997). Access may be linked to financial resources as studies have shown that money buys access to decision makers but not policy outcomes. See BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 117, at 193-94 (summarizing the literature on
the relationship between money and policymaking). Groups, however, may be able to overcome the financial obstacles to access by building expertise and relationships with policymakers over time. See EVANS, supra note 64, at 74, 88-97. Thus, they gain access because
policymakers identify them as informational resources and turn to them for advice.
129 See, e.g., Holyoake, supra note 118, at 333-34 (finding that membership in a coalition
increased the likelihood of lobbying in a venue); McKay, supra note 118, at 135 (explaining
that "the more money an organization spends on overall lobbying, the more likely the lobbyist
is to direct his or her efforts toward Congress or both branches over agencies."); McQuide,
supra note 118, at 14 (reporting that level of resources affected lobbying behavior with groups
having their own in-house lobbyist more likely to lobby beyond Congress).
' See McQuide, supra note 118, at 16 (finding that groups take partisanship into account
in determining which institutions to lobby).
"' Legal mobilization scholars have also noted the influence of elite support in advocacy
decision making. See Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 11, at 1257-67 (explaining how the
support of Gov. Davis influenced marriage equality strategies). In her assessment of the Tribal
Self-Determination Policy, Professor Gross notes that Indian advocacy was successful when
tribal leaders gained the support of political elites. See EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY FED-

ERAL POLICY TOWARD AMERICAN INDIANs 80,

85-86

(1989).

See Baumgartner, et al., supra note 11, at 13. Further, they argue, "Clearly, federal
government activities send strong cues to interested constituencies." Id.
3
' Id.
'" Thomas L. Gais & Jack L. Walker, Jr., Pathways to Influence, in American Politics, in
MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SocIAL MOVEMENTS
103, 112 (Jack L. Walker, Jr. ed., 1991).
" BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 117, at 80.
132

Lobbying Against. the Odds

2019]

49

group challenging the status quo.' 36 Another scholar found that the presence
of opposition, either alone or in a coalition, increased the likelihood of an
organization lobbying in a particular institution.'37 These findings align with
the predictions of other scholars, who have suggested that interest organizations mobilize politically when their interests are threatened.' 38 At the same
time, however, some groups may avoid conflict with opposing groups by
choosing to lobby in a different institution.13 9
Interest group scholars have identified many factors affecting groups'
decisions to lobby, but they have historically treated decisions to lobby in
isolation instead of considering how institutional dynamics could affect lobbying decisions. Only recently have these scholars started to consider how,
when, and why lobbyists lobby particular institutions.'o Thus, interest group
scholars have not explored thoroughly how institutional alternatives may affect a group's decision to lobby.
Interest group scholars have also more generally overlooked interactions among variables and how those interactions could affect advocates'
decisions to engage in legislative advocacy. Take resources as an example.
Groups vary in terms of financial resources, group membership, public support of their cause, allies, and personnel. A group with few financial resources but a large, active membership and a network of other allied groups
may have incentives to engage in legislative advocacy. The combination of
variables involved as well as how they interact may determine the incentives
and disincentives that groups face in deciding whether to engage in a particular strategy. For example, although some causes may not be salient to the
public, a group may choose to engage in legislative advocacy because they
have the support of political elites. Moreover, changes in one variable may
affect others and encourage a group to reformulate its advocacy strategy
over time. For instance, Witmer and Boehmke have argued that the increase
in resources provided by Indian gaming altered the opportunities tribes had
to lobby and contributed to their increased legislative advocacy.141 While
interest group scholars acknowledge the complexity of strategic decisionmaking and suggest that lobbyists make choices in response to constraints,

136

Id.

' See Holyoake, supra note 118, at 333.

13 See John Mark Hansen, The PoliticalEconomy of Group Membership, 79 Am. POL.
Sci. REV. 79 (1985). Ann Southworth's description of the rise in conservative and libertarian
public interest groups also seems illustrative of how groups mobilize when their interests are
threatened. See generally Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest Over the
Meaning of "PublicInterest Law," 52 UCLA L. REv. 1223 (2005).
'19 See Holyoake, infra note 118, at 334.
'" See, e.g., Holyoake, supra note 118; McKay, supra note 118; McQuide, supra note
118.
141 See Witmer and Boehmke, supra note 66, at 140.

50

HarvardJournal on Legislation

[Vol. 56

they have yet to explore adequately when and how opportunities and constraints interact to influence strategic decisionmaking over time. 142
B.

Sociolegal Approach

Sociolegal scholars investigate how and why groups use the law as a
political and strategic resource to challenge the status quo, change institutional rules, and redistribute power. 143 Advocates use the rhetorical resources
of the law-legal arguments, frameworks, and practices-to argue for social
change in multiple institutions, including but not limited to courts, agencies,
and legislatures.'" Most sociolegal studies, however, have focused on courts
and litigation activities.
Litigation strategies develop out of an ongoing interplay among advocates and the broader social and political environment. Advocates make
choices in "respon[se] to distinct political opportunities and constraints."1 45
Constraints may include limited organizational and material resources; 146 existing institutional and political barriers;1 47 the advocate's own experience,
skills, and understandings; countermobilization or opposition; perceptions of
efficiency, effectiveness, and the moral acceptability of various institutions;14 and views of the law. 4 9 Sociolegal scholars have demonstrated
142 See Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, State Transformation,
Globalization, and the
Possibilitiesof Cause Lawyering: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 12, at
13-14 (noting that merely listing factors is not enough to explain strategic decisionmaking).
143 See generally SCHEINGOLD, supra note 15; MCCANN, supra note 18; JOEL F. HANDLER,
SocIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SocIAL
CHANGE (1978); Cummings & Rhode, supra note 14, at 605.
'" See generally HANDLER, supra note 143; MCCANN, supra note 18; GERALD RosENBERG, supra note 15; GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW'S ALLURE: How LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS,
SAVES, AND KuLs Poorcs (2009); HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING, RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996).
145 See ALAN K. CHEN & Scorr L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 500 (2013). For a discussion of the choices faced by advocates, see
James M. Jasper, A Strategic Approach to Collective Action: Looking for Agency in SocialMovement Choices, 9 MOBrLZATION 1, 7-10 (2004).
" See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974); see also CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS

REVOLUTION:

(1998);

LAWYERS, Acrivis-rs, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
HANDLER, supra note 144.

147 See Sarat & Scheingold, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 12, at 12-13; SILVERSTEIN,
LAW'S ALLURE, supra note 144, at 127-28; Stephen L. Wasby, Litigation and Lobbying as

ComplementaryStrategiesfor Civil Rights, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CiVIL RIGHTs ACT (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).
141 See SILVERSTEIN, LAW'S ALLURE, supra note 144, at 131; Wasby, supra note 147, at
66-67.
149 See SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS supra note 144, at 21. This list is exemplary not
exhaustive. Other variables can also shape decisions to litigate, and scholars have produced
varying lists of them. See, e.g., Sarat & Scheingold, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 12, at
12-13 (listing the goals of the cause or the movement, the resources that it can make available
or that lawyers can mobilize, the possibilities at the practice site, the lawyer's own experience,
skills, and understandings, the lawyer's social capital and networks, the nature of existing social, political, and legal arrangements); see also CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 145, at
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through case studies how oftentimes these variables interact to facilitate the
use of a litigation strategy.5 0 Moreover, studies have shown that advocacy
decisions are fluid rather than static; advocates frequently adapt their strategies to fit changing social, political, and institutional conditions.'5 ' Strategic
decisionmaking, thus, is an ongoing, reiterative process that evolves over
time.1 52

In studying advocacy over time, sociolegal scholars have increasingly
examined the interplay between litigation and legislative strategies as well as
the linkages between courts and legislatures.' 53 But the focus has been on
explaining why groups litigate and understanding the effects of political mobilization on the development of litigation strategies.'1 As a result, sociolegal scholars have yet to question and test the conventional wisdom about
when groups choose to lobby.' 5 Rather, their studies have continued to suggest that groups litigate unless they are foreclosed from doing so and focused on the effects of political mobilization on the success of litigation
strategies. They have yet to fully consider how legal mobilization could positively or negatively affect advocates' use of a legislative strategy.' 56 In short,
sociolegal scholars have yet to unpack fully the complex relationships between litigation and legislative strategies.
Sociolegal scholars have recently suggested the need for further investigations into the utility of applying sociolegal theories in non-judicial con511-26 (identifying political support, political background, social context, institutional settings, and background as influencing advocacy decisions); Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at
Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Angeles, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1617, 1623 (2011) (listing
legal capacity, receptivity of the judiciary, mechanism of legal enforcement, and extent of
rights saturation); Cummings & Rhode, supra note 14, at 615 (explaining that "the effective
use of litigation requires a strategic analysis of the forces that shape its outcome, including
organizational capacity, the likelihood of success on the merits, the challenges of enforcement,
and the possible political responses.").
1so See Cummings, supra note 149, at 1623-24; see generally HANDLER, supra note 143.
's' See, e.g., HOLLY J. MCCAMMON, THE U.S. WOMEN'S JURY MOVEMENTS AND STRATEGIC ADAPTATION: A MORE JUST VERDICT 12 (2012); CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 145, at

518.
152 See, e.g., MCCAMMON, supra note 151, at 12; see generally SLVERSTEIN, LAw's ALLURE, supra note 144.
' See generally MCCANN, supra note 18; SILVERSTEIN, LAW'S ALLURE, supra note 144;

Wasby, supra note 147. Some have developed case studies of why groups choose particular
strategies, but they have not tried to extrapolate a broader understanding of the factors influencing institutional choices from these cases. See, e.g., Cummings & NeJaime, supra note 11,
at 1247-56 (arguing that marriage equality lawyers chose legislative strategies to avoid
litigating).
154 See, e.g., SILvERSTEIN, LAW'S ALLURE, supra note 144, at 15-41; Cummings, supra
note 149, at 1623. Sociolegal scholars have also emphasized the importance of political mobilization to enforce court decisions.
15 Some sociolegal scholars have repeated rather than questioned the conventional wisdom. For example, one sociolegal scholar recently hypothesized that a group will only choose
a legislative strategy if it has a high degree of political mobilization and does not have the
option of using a litigation strategy. Cummings, supra note 149, at 1625.
56 Carlson, supra note 67, at 935-36; Cummings, supra note 149, at 1623. A few scholars
have started to consider the effects of legal mobilization on legislative advocacy. See, e.g.,
SILVERSTEIN, LAW'S ALLURE, supra note 144, at 35-41.
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texts and explored some initial ways of doing this. 57 These studies suggest
that the interactive approach used by sociolegal studies may enhance existing understandings of groups' advocacy choices. But they have yet to extend the sociolegal approach to address fully when and why groups engage
in legislative and other non-judicial forms of advocacy and to explore the
relational aspects of institutional choices.
V.

A

GENERALIZABLE APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING
ADVOCACY CHOICES

This Part combines insights from the interest group and sociolegal literatures to construct a generally applicable framework for understanding how
groups choose advocacy strategies and how their strategies evolve across
institutions over time. It treats institutional choices as relational and evolving rather than binary and emphasizes that advocates craft strategies by considering their alternatives and options.
In devising this new approach, I start from the premise, shared by many
political scientists and sociolegal scholars, that advocates choose strategies
in response to social, political, and institutional constraints. Then I borrow
the factors found by political scientists to influence lobbying and integrate
them into the interactive approach for understanding advocacy choices used
by sociolegal scholars. These factors include, but are not limited to, resources, opposition, political capacity, legal capacity, institutional receptivity, and the political context. By including factors relevant to both legislative
and judicial processes, my approach allows for a fuller discussion of the
factors influencing advocacy choices and for a more nuanced investigation
of how advocates consider institutional alternatives in crafting strategies.
Once these factors are identified, I, like other sociolegal scholars, consider
the interactions among them and how those interactions affect strategic
choices. Finally, I highlight the relational aspects of advocacy decisions by
considering the interactions among the different strategies that groups
face.' Thus, my approach emphasizes the ongoing, dynamic nature of crafting advocacy strategies over time.
My approach improves on the existing frameworks in several ways.
First, by integrating the two literatures, it provides for a fuller discussion of
the conditions influencing the development of advocacy strategies. Recent
political science and sociolegal studies suggest that political capacity, resources, the political context, and opposition influence the development of
lobbying strategies.159 They have predicted how each category of variables
affects the likelihood that advocates will choose a legislative strategy but
15 Carlson, supra note 67, at 962.
15

See generally SILVERSTEIN, LAW'S ALLURE, supra note 144, at 35-41 (considering

some of the negative effects of legal mobilization on legislative advocacy); Cummings, supra
note 149, at 1623 (noting the potential relationships among political and legal mobilizations).
1

" See supra Part II.
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have yet to consider the dynamics among these different factors. 6 0 Sociolegal theory expands understandings of strategic decisionmaking by viewing
the development of advocacy strategies as ongoing, interactive processes.
Adopting this view suggests that groups continually respond to opportunities
and constraints and may respond by reshaping their advocacy strategies. But
its singular application to questions of why groups litigate overlooks how
institutional differences may influence advocates' choices. Advocates cannot
make informed choices about which strategy to use without understanding
the different factors that influence the various strategies that they may pursue. Integrating the factors identified by interest group scholars into the sociolegal framework expands it to include information about legislative
advocacy strategies and thus, provides for a more comprehensive consideration of the conditions influencing advocacy strategies as they develop across
institutions.
Second, my approach allows for deeper investigation into how various
conditions interact with one another to influence how and why groups use
different strategies over time. The interest group literature has identified
many of the factors influencing decisions to lobby but has yet to analyze
fully the dynamics among them.' 6 ' The sociolegal approach suggests how to
uncover the interactions among variables that shape and reshape advocacy
decisions. As sociolegal scholars have demonstrated, contextualized investigations are needed to understand how variables interact in any particular
case.16 2 Variables may exist in various combinations and have different effects on advocacy choices. Some variables may correlate and have a multiplicative impact. For example, a favorable political context and resources
may produce a stronger political capacity and facilitate the use of a legislative strategy. Other combinations of variables could have crosscutting influences on an advocacy strategy.1 63 For instance, a favorable political context
in terms of a legislative champion may encourage the use of a legislative
strategy but a group may be limited in its ability to mobilize if it lacks resources, and thus the group may choose not to lobby. The dynamics of other
factors may produce feedback effects, reiterating or undermining legislative
advocacy. For example, changes in the political context may alter a group's
" See supra Part II.
II.
62 Chen and Cummings note that:

161 See supra Part

As this work illustrates, careful case studies of law and social change campaigns can
provide rich descriptive accounts of the strategic and tactical decisions that lawyers
and other movement leaders have to make and whether those decisions prove effective, what barriers arise, which institutional settings are the battlegrounds for the
campaign and why, how groups collaborate and work against opponents to reach
their desired goals, and what happens in the aftermath of even a successful
campaign.
CHEN & CuMMINGs, supra note 145, at 500.

'63 For an exploration of how variables act in crosscutting ways in affecting the success of
social reform movements, see generally HANDLER, supra note 143.
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political capacity, making legislative advocacy an option and encouraging a
group to lobby. Over time, the group's decision to lobby may create a feedback loop in which the group's increased political capacity enables it to further improve the political context by generating allies within the
legislature.'M Contextualized investigations will allow scholars to examine
how advocacy decisions evolve through various pathways and will lead to
the identification of those pathways.
Third, my approach provides a more comprehensive view of the
choices advocates make and the constraints they face in crafting strategies
because it includes consideration of institutional differences. Some of the
variables affecting decisions to lobby either differ from those influencing
decisions to litigate or operate differently depending on the institutional context.'16 While some factors transcend institutional targets and play a role in
advocates' strategic decisionmaking across institutions,1 66 other factors influence one institution more than another. For example, electoral concerns may
matter considerably less, if at all, to a court but can play a significant role in
the legislative process.' 67 By considering differences in factors based on institutional venue, my framework enhances current understandings of why
groups craft specific advocacy strategies and change them over time.
Fourth, this approach emphasizes the relational nature of advocacy decisions. It builds on existing insights by considering how various institutional options relate to one another and how those relationships affect
institutional choices. Advocacy strategies do not develop in isolation but in
the shadow of the other available options.16 The most well-known example
of this is the conventional wisdom that groups litigate because they have no
other avenue for redress due to their exclusion from the political process.1 69
Some scholars, however, have suggested that the inverse may also be true:
Advocates may choose legislative strategies because of judicial risk or hos'
This situation may produce more of a feedback spiral than a feedback loop because the
advocacy choices were made at different points in time and the advocacy at time one affects
the advocacy decision made at time two (in this particular example, the decision at time one
increases the likelihood of the use of the same strategy at time two).
165 For a review of the factors sociolegal scholars have found to influence advocates' decisions to litigate, see supra note 149.
" For instance, almost all advocates consider their financial resources in crafting a strategy regardless of the institutional target.
167 BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 117, at 325-26 n.10. Other examples of factors that
play out differently in courts than legislative processes include: access, which may affect legislatures more because courts have to accept cases filed in them as long as the jurisdictional and
pleading requirements are met; electoral concerns, which may only affect courts with elected
judges and may impact them less than legislators; and support of political elites, which may
influence courts less due to judicial independence. A few factors play special roles in one
institution but not the other. For example, courts are bound by precedent and the rules of stare
decisis in ways that legislatures are not. SHLVERSTETN, LAWs ALLURE, supra note 144, at
68-70. Thus, legislatures may have more freedom to depart from precedent than a court does.
'"Sociolegal scholars have long noted that institutions do not operate in isolation. See,
e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
169 See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 143.
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tility.70 While these accounts suggest that an institution's receptivity (or lack
thereof) to a groups' claims may affect venue choice, institutional relationships may influence advocates' choices in other ways as well, especially as
advocates turn to multi-institutional strategies. Advocates may choose a
strategy that seeks to maximize coordination among institutions.' 7 ' A common instance of this kind of strategy is advocates' choosing to litigate to
raise awareness of an issue and get it on a legislative agenda.17 2 Alternatively, advocates may craft strategies that play institutions off one another.
For example, advocates may develop legislative strategies to highlight
problems in judicial or administrative processes and use the legislature either
to pressure these institutions or to reverse their decisions."' By considering
various factors and how they interact across institutions over time, contextualized investigations illuminate the social dynamics in which groups shape
society through the claims they make but, at the same time, are shaped by
the institutions and social contexts in which they make those claims.
Finally, the framework presented here expands theoretical understandings by suggesting an approach to studying advocacy that applies across
institutions and does not just explain why groups litigate or lobby. This approach acknowledges differences in interest communities rather than attempts to develop a one-size-fits-all theory. It offers a straightforward
explanation, namely that advocates choose strategies in response to opportunities and constraints. The approach, however, also allows for complexity by
integrating factors specific to particular institutions and adopting the contextualized investigations of specific cases used by sociolegal scholars. This
approach, thus, models a way for scholars to devise more complex understandings of advocacy strategies and how they develop across institutions
over time.
VI.

How

AND WHY AMERICAN INDIANS CHOOSE
LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY

This Part uses the approach outlined in Part V to provide a more

nuanced and complete explanation of the rise in legislative advocacy by
American Indian tribes and organizations over the past thirty-five years. It
170

See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, LAW'S ALLURE, supra note 144, at 30-33; CHEN & CUMMINGS,

supra note 145, at 524.
1' Some scholars have suggested that advocates could use strategic coherence, the conscious coordination of legal and political strategies, to increase their chances of success. Erich
W. Steinman, Legitimizing American IndianSovereignty: Mobilizing the Constitutive Power of
Law Through Institutional Entrepreneurship, 39 LAW & Soc. REV. 759, 763 (2005). For a
fuller discussion of coherence, see generally Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics
of Reform: Lessons from School Finance Litigation in Kentucky 1984-1995, 26 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 631 (2001).

112 Steinman describes this model as: "legal mobilization -+ political pressure
Steinman, supra note 171, at 763.
1' See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 67, at 948-50.
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identifies some of the factors influencing American Indians to choose legislative strategies and the mechanisms by which these factors interacted to
encourage American Indian legislative advocacy. The overarching theory
here is that American Indians have chosen legislative strategies in response
to a combination of factors, including changes in the political context, the
availability of resources, the development of their political capacity, and the
receptivity of federal institutions towards Indian claims.
Changes in congressional policy and process set the stage for the increase in legislative advocacy by American Indians at the end of the twentieth century. In the 1970s, Congress enacted the Tribal Self-Determination
Policy, which acknowledged the importance of tribal input and participation
in Indian affairs policymaking. American Indians further gained access to
the political system with the institutionalization of Indian affairs within the
congressional committee system. These changes in the political context in
turn altered the political capacity of American Indians. As Indian tribes engaged more in the policymaking process, they gained expertise and access to
policymakers, enabling them to secure a more favorable political climate.
This feedback loop encouraged American Indians to choose to advocate legislatively. Changes in the receptivity of the Supreme Court to rights claims
further bolstered American Indian legislative advocacy. An increasingly hostile Supreme Court pushed American Indians to consider alternatives to litigation and to seek congressional fixes to detrimental Supreme Court
decisions. Finally, the introduction of new resources into Indian country,
especially the rise in economic development due to gaming, further contributed to American Indian legislative advocacy. It both enabled and encouraged some American Indians to expand their lobbying and fueled new
opposition to American Indian legislative advocacy.
A.

Political Context: The Tribal Self-Determination Policy Sets the Stage
for American Indian Legislative Advocacy

A tremendous shift in federal Indian-affairs policy occurred in the
1970s and set the stage for the explosion in American Indian legislative advocacy. 7 4 Congress, historically the primary actor in the creation of Indian
policy, had relegated Indian affairs a backseat in the legislative process by
1951.75 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 reduced the status of
the Indian Affairs Committees in both houses.' 76 This change in committee
status along with a resurgence of assimilationist voices in Congress negatively affected Congress's ability to legislate appropriate solutions to

174

For a full discussion of the role of the Executive Branch in this shift, see generally

CASTILE, supra note 38.
"7 WuiLINs & STARK, supra note 8, at 89.
176

Id.
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problems affecting Indian people.' 77 Congress continued to promote termination and relocation policies aimed at undermining tribal self-determination
and encouraging Indian assimilation throughout the 1960s.17 1
Forces outside the legislative branch precipitated the shift in Indian affairs policy. The inclusion of Indians in general legislation and programs had
the unintended consequence of encouraging both Indians and Executive
Branch officials to rethink Indian affairs. Despite a lack of presidential interest'79 and a weak Indian lobby,s0 the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
wrote Indians into various bills meant to improve the lives of the poor and
underserved.'8 ' Central to the War on Poverty, the Economic Opportunity
Act created the Office of Economic Opportunity ("OEO") and its Community Action Program to empower poor people on a local level to reform
institutions to end poverty. The Johnson Administration wanted to include
Indians in these programs.18 2 In 1964, American Indian leaders lobbied for
OEO funding to go directly to tribes (rather than the states).' As a result,
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 made tribal governments eligible for
OEO grants.'" Bypassing the BIA, the OEO programs channeled significant
amounts of federal money directly to Indian tribes.' Indian tribes could
spend this money and administer programs on their own.1 86 As a result of
this transfer of authority for local decisionmaking, tribal governments gained
competence in planning and running their own programs."' These experiences empowered Indians, encouraging them to consider policy proposals
similar to the OEO programs that could replace the termination policy.' 8
Moreover, the success of these programs in Indian country prompted federal
officials to reconsider their approach to Indian affairs.'8 9 The policy climate

177 Id.; see also CASTILE, supra note 38, at xxi-xxvii (discussing the forces facilitating the
creation of the termination policy).
"' CASTILE, supra note 38, at 58-60.
19 Id. at 4 (explaining that the Kennedy Administration showed very little interest in Indian affairs).
Iso To be fair, the NCAI launched a campaign against termination in the early 1950s and
scored some important victories. COWGER, supra note 33, at 116-19 (noting that the NCAI
managed to modify the first termination bill and prevent termination of certain tribes). But the
Indian lobby more generally remained weak. CASTLE, supra note 38, at 4.
.8. CASTILE, supra note 38, at 4, 24-25.
182 Id. at 29.

CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS

18

127-28 (2005) (identifying this as the first time in American history that "Indian people had
conceived of a provision to be inserted in national legislation and then lobbied it through
Congress into law.").
'" Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508.
'8 CASTILE, supra note 38, at 31-33.
86 Id. at 33 ("Prior to the entry of the Community Action programs, virtually all funds on
reservations were directly administered by the federal agencies that allocated them.").
SWILKINSON,

supra note 183, at 191-94.

supra note 38, at 48.
189 Id. at 68-69.
188

CASTILE,
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was shifting from one of termination to self-determination by the end of the
Johnson Administration.'0
President Nixon embraced the self-determination approach in his 1968
presidential campaign and his support stimulated the adoption of this approach as federal Indian policy.19 ' By 1970, President Nixon had publicly
repudiated the negative Indian policies of the 1950s and replaced them with
the Tribal Self-Determination Policy.1 92 During his presidency, Nixon sent
several legislative proposals to Congress, which renounced termination in
favor of a policy of tribal self-determination.1 93
While resistance from a Democratic Congress initially undermined
many of President Nixon's initiatives, his enduring commitment to tribal
self-determination may have helped soften such opposition in this area. Aiming to run for the presidency, Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) reversed his
position on termination and sponsored a self-determination bill that the Senate passed in 1972.194 Senator Jackson continued to sponsor self-determination legislation with Representative Lloyd Meeds (D-Wash.) and Senator
James Abourezk (D-S.D.) supporting his efforts in 1974.195
Strong executive branch support along with the failure of the termination policy and supportive leadership in Congress encouraged Congress to
embrace a tribal self-determination policy.' 96 It formally adopted the Self19

Id.

'' Id.

at 73-74.

supra note 131, at 34-38. According to Gross, Nixon attributed his positive
stance towards American Indians to the influence of his college football coach. Id. at 70-71.
'9' CASTILE, supra note 38, at 92-98, 155-56. Unable to secure passage of their legislative
proposals, the Nixon administration sought to implement the self-determination policy by
making changes to and within the BIA. Id. at 87-91.
'" CASTILE, supra note 38, at 105-06. Senator Jackson's pro-Indian stance waivered in the
1970s, but lasted long enough to secure passage of self-determination legislation. Id. at
166-68.
'9 CASTILE, supra note 38, at 166-68.
" GROSS, supra note 131, at 75-86; CASTILE, supra note 38, at 165-68. Lobbying may
have also played a role in Congress's adoption of the Self-Determination Policy, but scholars
disagree about the extent to which Congress consulted tribes in formulating the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act ("ISDEAA"). Wilkinson admits that Indian people did not play a direct role in formulating the Self-Determination Policy, WILuaNSON, supra
note 183, at 189, but notes that the arrival of American Indians as staffers to the Senate Interior
Committee and the House Interior Committee in the early 1970s contributed to the change in
policy and explosion of Indian legislation, id. at 195. Strommer and Osborne similarly report a
lack of tribal input on the ISDEAA. Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. Rnv. 1, 20 (2015). In contrast, Delaney suggests
that tribal advocates initially suggested that the Kennedy administration "use the government
contracting process as a mechanism for transferring control over federal funds and programs
from agencies to tribes." Danielle Delaney, The Master'sTools: TribalSovereignty and Tribal
Self-Governance Contracting/Compacting,5 Am. INDIAN L.J. 308, 328 (2017). It is unclear
whether Delaney is referring to tribal lobbying for Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
funding to go directly to tribes (rather than the states) in 1964 or something else. Tribes and
tribal coalitions testified at committee hearings held prior to the enactment of the ISDEAA, but
it is not clear whether they played any other role in the policy's development. See, e.g., Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1987: Hearing on S. 1703
192 GRoss,
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Determination Policy with the enactment of the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act ("ISDEAA") in 1975.191 The Act declared,
"[T]he United States is committed to supporting and assisting Indian tribes
in the development of strong and stable tribal governments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the economies of their respective communities." 9 It enabled tribes to build their institutional capacities
and economies by transferring control over federal programs to the tribes.
The ISDEAA required the Secretaries of the Interior and Health and Human
Services, upon the request of any Indian tribe, to contract with tribal organizations to operate federal programs for Indians.'"

Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 37 (1987) (statement of Joe DeLaCruz, President, Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians) (explaining that he was "directly
involved in the policy discussion leading to the original Self-Determination Act"); Indian SelfDeterminationand Education ProgramHearing on S. 107 and Related Bills Before S. Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 106-12, 133-37 (1973) (statements of Valentino
Cordova, Chairman, All Indian Pueblo Council, Joe Upicksoun, Chairman, Education Committee of the National Tribal Chairman's Association); Indian Self-Determination Act of 1972:
Hearingon S. 3157, S. 1573, S. 1574, and S. 2238 Before the S. Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of
the S. Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 92d Cong. 69-76, 78-79 (1972) (statements of
Franklin Ducheneaux, Legislative Consultant, NCAI, Buffalo Tiger, Chairman, Miccosukee
Business Committee, and S. Bobo Dean, Council for Association on American Indian Affairs).
Their testimony may have influenced some members of Congress. Even if the testimony did
not sway any legislators to vote for the ISDEAA, it demonstrated that Indians could participate
in the policymaking process and it probably impacted future lobbying efforts, especially as the
political context shifted. A reinforcing cycle emerges: Indians testify before Congress, which
impacts substantive policy decisions and opens the door for more political participation leading to more Indian lobbying. This feedback loop contributed to the rise in American Indian
lobbying at the end of the twentieth century.
Few scholars, however, have attributed this shift in policy to the Red Power Movement,
which reached its height in the early 1970s. At least one scholar has noted that the American
Indian Movement movement did not mention self-determination in its demands and most
likely stalled implementation of the tribal self-determination policy. CASTILE, supra note 38, at
111-46.
1' CORNELL, supra note 27, at 204.
19 25 U.S.C. § 5302 (2012); see also 25 U.S.C. § 4101 (2012).
1- 25 U.S.C. § 5302. In 1994, Congress amended the ISDEAA to allow tribes more flexibility in administering Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service programs through
the creation of self-governance compacts. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250. The Self-Determination Policy, however, has come
to encompass more than the ISDEAA. Congress has enacted several other major pieces of
legislation, which reinforce its commitment to treating Indian tribes as governments and building their institutions and economies. WILKINS & STARK, supra note 8, at 267-69 (listing 23
bills enacted between 1975 and 2010 as major congressional law affecting Indians). Castile
identifies several other pieces of legislation that implement the Self-Determination Policy.
GEORGE PIERRE CASTILE, TAKING CHARGE:

NATIVE AMERICAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND

FEDERAL INDIAN PoucY, 1975-1993, 30, 90 (2006). For example, Congress has recognized the
importance of tribal self-determination in the delivery of healthcare through the Indian Healthcare Improvement Act of 1976, see, e.g., Indian Healthcare Improvement Act of 1976, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1603 (2012); Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2501-2511. Congress ensured tribal control over the placement of Indian children in the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069, and fostered the development of tribal legal systems in the Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat.
2004 (1993), and the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258.
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The adoption of the Tribal Self-Determination Policy signaled a dramatic shift in the federal government's position on American Indian policy.2 00 For the first time since the 1930s, Congress promulgated a policy that
supported Indian nations as separate governments and invited their participation in federal policymaking. 201 Under the ISDEAA, money flowed directly
to tribal governments, bypassing the BIA and enabling Indian nations to
make important decisions regarding their welfare. Tribes, which had begun
to administer programs under the OEO, embraced the ISDEAA and complained about the BIA's reluctance in implementing it.202
Despite some initial resistance, the new perspective on Indian affairs
embodied in the Tribal Self-Determination Policy "eventually came to pervade [Congress's] entire approach to Indian affairs." 203 Throughout the rest
of the 1970s and early 1980s, Congress enacted several key bills expanding
and enhancing the Tribal Self-Determination Policy. 204 This legislation institutionalized the Tribal Self-Determination Policy and reinforced the growing
capacity of Indian nations as governments. 205
This change in the political context facilitated the development of Indian political capacity and lobbying. By encouraging Indian political participation, the Tribal Self-Determination Policy increased opportunities for
tribes to lobby. As tribes engaged in more lobbying, they gained experience
and developed more sophisticated lobbying strategies, which further reinforced their ability to lobby. After decades of enacting policies destructive to
American Indians, Congress appeared much friendlier to American Indian
interests.

GROss, supra note 131, at xvi.
supra note 27, at 204-05.
202 E. Fletcher McClellan, Implementation and Policy Reformulation of Title
1 of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975-80, 6 WICAZO SA REv. 45, 50
(1990); Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience (forthcoming
2018) _ BYU L. Rev.
203 GROSS, supra note 131, at 78.
2
1See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1603; 25 U.S.C. §§2501-2511; 108 Stat. 42-50; 107 Stat.
2004; 92 Stat. 3069; American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, Pub. Law. No. 95-341,
92 Stat. 469; see also supra note 199.
205 The Tribal Self-Determination Policy may have also stimulated American Indian legislative advocacy by helping some Indian nations build their internal capacities to deliver programs and services to their citizens. The stakes Indian nations had in the implementation of
these programs and services increased as they gained direct managerial control over them.
Tribes, thus, had more incentives both in protecting these programs and in advocating for
improvements in them. Moreover, as their internal capacities grew, Indian tribes gained expertise in these areas, making them more knowledgeable about the programs that work in their
communities and more able to advocate effectively to policymakers. GROss, supra note 131, at
108.
2'

201 CORNELL,
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Political Capacity: The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Creates
Access for American Indians

B.

While the Tribal Self-Determination Policy signaled a new receptivity
to American Indian participation in policymaking, the formation of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs helped create the basic conditions for
American Indians to engage in legislative advocacy. 206 The Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs emerged out of the recommendations of the
American Indian Policy Review Commission ("AIPRC"), a bipartisan committee charged with investigating the historical and legal relationship between Indians and the government and proposing ways to revise Indian
policy and programs to benefit Indians. 207 The AIPRC specifically recommended the creation of permanent Indian Affairs committees in both houses
of Congress. 208 The AIRPC expressed grave concerns about the results of the
termination of such committees in 1946. It justified its recommendation on
congressional plenary power over the administration of Indian affairs. 209 In
response to the AIPRC recommendations, the Senate extended the duration
of a temporary Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1977 and then made
the committee permanent in 1984.210
The existence of a longstanding Senate Committee on Indian Affairs
has created unprecedented opportunities for American Indian legislative advocacy. Structurally, it gives "Indian constituencies a unique opportunity to
make their policy preferences known."211 American Indians have seized this
opportunity by directly lobbying members of the committee and hiring
Washington lobbyists to represent them on important matters. 212
A spillover effect of these increased opportunities for American Indian
legislative advocacy has been that congressional perceptions about who
speaks for American Indians have changed dramatically. Historically, members of Congress had ignored Indian constituencies in formulating Indian
policy.213 If they paid attention to Indian interests at all, members of Congress turned to the BIA or non-Indian friends of the Indians for advice. 2 14
The influx of American Indians lobbying members of Congress, however,
has altered this dynamic and created a feedback loop supportive of Indian
legislative advocacy. As American Indians gained access to members of
Congress and their staffs, they built relationships with them. 2 15 Through

206 Id. at xx.
207 WILKINS & STARK,
20

supra note 8, at 90.

Id.

208

1 Id.

210

Id. at 91.
GROSS, supra note 131, at 77, 103.
212
Id. at 99-105.
213 Id. at 79 ("In fact, before 1970, Indian constituencies were so insignificant in policy
development that they were virtually invisible.").
214 Id. at 77.
215 EvANs, supra note 64, at 7,
74.
211

62

HarvardJournal on Legislation

[Vol. 56

these relationships, members of Congress and their staffs have increasingly
learned to trust the information and advice they obtain from American Indians.216 As a result, they now identify American Indian organizations and tribal governments as experts and, thus, seek their advice on policymaking.2 17
Thus, relationship building has reinforced the ability of American Indians to
influence policy by providing them with increased and continued access to
legislators and their staffs.
The institutionalization of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs over
the past forty years has demonstrated political support for Indian affairs and
further encouraged American Indians to choose legislative strategies. The
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs has broad authority to develop and
oversee polices related to American Indians. 218 In setting its own agenda, it
has been exceptionally active and committed to implementation of the Tribal
Self-Determination Policy. 2 19 The committee has "examined a plethora of
issues, including land-related topics, health concerns, housing, education, economic development, water claims, land claims, trust funds, gaming, recognition, natural resources and environmental concerns, religious freedom, the
committee administrative tasks, Alaska Natives, Indian child welfare, and
tribal-state relations." 220 The hearings and other congressional attention to
these myriad issues has stimulated legislative advocacy by signaling to
American Indians that the committee, or at least some of its members, support their issues and want to hear their concerns. 221
Moreover, this government support led to results, and thus, further
spurred American Indians to use legislative strategies. Members of Congress
216 Id. at 74-97. In effect, American Indians have become repeat players in legislative
policymaking. They gain many of the benefits that repeat players obtain in other policymaking
venues, such as the courts. For a discussion of repeat players, see generally Marc Galanter,
supra note 146.
217 GROSS, supra note 131, at 99 ("Indian tribes played a central role in developing the
political agenda and in bringing about the policy successes of the seventies.").
218 Wilkins & Stark explain:

The Committee on Indian Affairs is the authorizing committee for programs of the
BIA in the Department of the Interior, the Indian Health Service and the Administration for Native Americans in the Department of Health and Human Services, and the
Office of Indian Education in the Department of Education. Furthermore, the Committee has oversight responsibility for programs affecting Indians in all other federal
agencies, including the Indian Housing program of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.
These responsibilities dovetail with those specified in Senate Resolution 4, which
include matters relating to tribal and individual lands; the federal government's trust
responsibilities; and Indian education, health, Indian land claims, and natural resources. In effect, this committee (like the subcommittee in the House) is charged
with an enormous task: the oversight of Congress's continuing historical, constitutional, and legislative responsibilities to 565 distinctive indigenous entities.
WILYJNS & STARK, supra note 8, at 92-93.
2 19

Id. at 93.
Id.
221 See Baumgartner et al., supra note 11, at 13 (showing that governmental
support of an
issue increases lobbying on that issue).
220
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have proposed, and Congress has enacted a tremendous amount of legislation related to American Indians. 222 Moreover, a significant proportion of
these bills supported or expanded the Tribal Self-Determination Policy. 2 2 3 In
1994, Congress dramatically broadened the self-determination program, expanding the tribal role beyond the federal responsibilities of the Department
of Interior to include health, housing, and environmental protection. 224 Congress also entertained multiple legislative proposals aimed at improving the
health, education, and housing of American Indians. 22 5 The receptivity of
Congress to pro-Indian bills both reflected and encouraged American Indian
legislative advocacy. It appeared that American Indians had little to lose and
much to gain by going to Congress.
C.

Shifting Institutional Dynamics: Legislative Advocacy and the Courts

Indian nations had several options for pursuing their claims when they
initially turned to Congress. Indian tribes had successfully gone to the courts
for recognition of their rights, and the courts remained a viable option.. As
Congress opened its doors to American Indian advocacy, however, the
courts increasingly closed theirs. The rise of American Indian legislative advocacy occurred as federal courts, and especially the Supreme Court, became less receptive to American Indian litigants.

226

Federal courts were

never consistent protectors of American Indian rights, but their decisions
started trending against American Indian litigants in the late 1970s. 227 The
Court handed down some particularly devastating cases in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. 22 8 These early losses, however, did not dissuade American Indi222 See Carlson, supra note 2, at 119 (showing that Congress enacted close to 20 percent
of all Indian-related bills from 1979 to 1991 and close to 15 percent from 1991 to 1997 as
compared to less than 10 percent of all bills generally during this time period).
223 See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, American Indian Self-Determination:The Political Economy of a Policy that Works 22 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Faculty Research Working
Paper Series No. RWPlO-043, 2010) ("Over 1973-2010, there have been 151 sponsors of 41
combined House and Senate legislative proposals supporting or expanding tribal selfdetermination.").
224 Indian Self Determination Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. 2, 108 Stat.
4250 (1994); see generally Strommer & Osborne, supra note 196.
22 See Cornell & Kalt, supra note 223. at 22 ("Over the same period [1973-2010], there
have been 2,405 sponsors of 305 legislative measures aimed at improving conditions for
American Indians, typically through increased spending on health, education, housing and the
like.").
226 Fletcher, supra note 57, at 935 (showing that the success rate of tribal litigants in the
Supreme Court has not improved since 2001); Getches, supra note 56, at 280-81 (2001) (finding that tribes lost 82 percent of the cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1991-2000).
227 See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 478-83
(1976).
228 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195; Moe, 425 U.S. at 478-83; Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 547-50 (1981); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 152-58 (1980). In hindsight, these cases appeared to forewarn that a shift was
coming in the Supreme Court, and Indian advocates were displeased with them at the time.
See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Mark the Plumber v. Tribal Empire, or Non-Indian Anxiety v. Tribal
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ans from litigating, and American Indians continued to win 60 percent of the
cases heard by the Supreme Court until 1987.229 It would take almost another
decade of decisions adverse to Indian country for American Indians to question their faith in the Supreme Court.
A growing number of losses in the Supreme Court, however, eventually
pushed American Indians to consider alternative strategies and engage in
legislative advocacy. By the mid-1980s, American Indians were accumulating losses in the Supreme Court. 23 0 The Supreme Court stripped tribes of
their criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 231 and non-member Indians, 23 2
limited tribal civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians, 233 permitted
state taxation on Indian lands,m1 and refused to recognize some tribal water
rights.

23 5

The extent of the losses further encouraged Indian tribes to go to Congress. The Supreme Court started to "veer[ ] away from the foundations of
Indian law." 236 It ignored precedents favorable to tribal rights and abandoned
its earlier approach of relying on Congress "to decide clearly the bounds of
Indian sovereignty." 237 As a result, the Court started remaking federal Indian
law on terms much less favorable to American Indians 2 38 and placing the
Sovereignty? The Story of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in INoAN LAW STORIES
283-85 (Carole Goldberg, et al. eds., 2011) (describing reactions to Oliphant). But in the same
year that the Court decided Oliphant, the Court also handed down two cases that upheld tribal
sovereignty. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326-32 (1978) (holding that tribes
retain the inherent power to try their own members); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 52, 55-56 (1978) (holding that the Indian Civil Rights Act did not allow suits against tribes
in federal courts except for petitions for habeas corpus).
229 Fletcher, supra note 57, at
942.
230 Getches, supra note 56, at 273-74.
231 Oliphant, 435 U.S.
at 195.
232 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688
(1990).
233 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 363-70 (2001); Strate v. A-I
Contractors, 520 U.S.
438, 442 (1997); Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-67.
234 Moe, 425 U.S. at 478-83
(1976).
235 See, e.g., Colorado River Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809-13,
820-21 (1976);
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-67; Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 113 (1983); Arizona v.
San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. 545, 570-71(1983); see also Lloyd Burton, supra note 55, at 39
(noting that in 1987 Indian nations had lost five of the last six water rights cases brought
before the U.S. Supreme Court).
236 Getches, supra note 56, at 274 ("Indeed, the Court has forsaken not only those foundational cases, but it has ignored most of the intervening 150 years of decisions, including nearly
all of its approximately eighty modem decisions."). For example, a mere three years after
Congress enacted the Tribal Self-Determination Policy, the Court stripped Indian nations of
their inherent criminal authority to prosecute non-Indian offenders in Oliphant. 435 U.S. at
205-06. In Oliphant, the Court departed from its previous practice of deferring to Congress in
Indian affairs and introduced a new doctrine, called implicit divestiture, which allowed the
Court to divest tribal powers that it deemed inconsistent with the tribe's status as a domestic
dependent nation. Id. at 206, 208. Prior to the Oliphant decision, only Congress had plenary
power over Indian affairs and could determine the sovereign rights of Indian nations. The
Court in Oliphant seemed to be allocating plenary power to itself.
237 Getches, supra note 56, at
276.
238 Id. ("mhe present Supreme Court is shunning its own legal
traditions and creating
new rules that conform to its own perceptions of current realities, instead of staying its hand
and forcing the political branches to deliberate the difficult choices.").
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burden on American Indians to convince Congress to clarify its position on
Indian affairs in legislation. 23 9
These shifts in the Court's Indian law jurisprudence deterred some
American Indians from litigating 2" and provided incentives for tribal lawyers and advocates to turn to Congress to protect tribal interests, especially
tribal self-determination and jurisdiction. 24 1 Adverse decisions ceased being
outliers, and scholars started reporting the abysmally low win rates of American Indians. 242 One influential study revealed that American Indians lost in
the Supreme Court over seventy-five percent of the time-more frequently
than convicted felons-from 1986 to 2000.243 A later study confirmed the
continued hostility of courts towards American Indians, reporting that American Indians were still losing seventy-five percent of their cases in the Supreme Court in 2009.2" The risks of losing seemed to outweigh the benefits
of litigating cases.
These changing institutional dynamics encouraged American Indians to
avoid the courts and engage more in legislative processes. By the 1990s,
American Indians had responded to the devastating losses they were facing
in the courts by actively coordinating and launching legislative campaigns to
overturn unfavorable Supreme Court decisions. 245 For example, less than a
month after the Supreme Court held that Indian nations did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians in Duro v. Reina,246 the NCAI
"had convened a meeting of tribal, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and congressional representatives to discuss the implications of the case and discuss possible legislative responses." 247 Meetings with tribal leaders ensued over the
summer to develop a legislative proposal and mobilize Indian country behind it.248 Congress acted swiftly to reverse the Court. Six months after the
Court handed down the Duro decision, Congress enacted temporary legislation restoring inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians as part
of a defense appropriations bill.2 49
239 Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 431, 483 (2005) (noting how, in the past, tribal success in the courts placed the
legislative burden on tribal opponents, so that tribes were in the easier position of trying to kill
reactive legislation rather than seeking legislation on their own behalf).
' Burton, supra note 55, at 39.
241 Berger, supra note 58, at 12 (detailing advocacy in the Duro fix legislation); Getches,
supra note 56, at 276 (suggesting that the legislative process has advantages over
adjudication).
242 Getches, supra note 56, at 280-81.
243 Id. ("Convicted criminals achieved reversals in 36 percent of all cases that reached the
Supreme Court in the same period, compared to the tribes' 23 percent success rate.").
24 Fletcher, supra note 57, at 935.
245 Berger, supra note 58, at 12; Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct
Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INoAN L. REv. 109, 110 (1992).
24495
247

U.S. 676 (1990).

Berger, supra note 58, at 12; Newton, supra note 245, at 110.
248 Berger, supra note 58, at 12.
249 Berger, supra note 58, at 12; Newton, supra note 245, at 111; see also Skibine, supra
note 75, at 767-68.
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This temporary Duro fix expired at the end of a year so Indian advocates and tribal leaders mobilized to amend the law and remove the expiration date. 250 Congressman Bill Richardson (D-N.M.) introduced a bill, which
quickly passed in the House. 251 Two similar bills, introduced by Senator Inouye (D-Haw.) and supported by Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.), Pete
Domenici (R-N.M.), Paul Simon (D-Ill.), and Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.), encountered opposition from Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), who argued that
because of its constitutional nature, Congress could not alter the Duro decision. 25 2 As a result, the Senate amended one of the bills to include another
temporary two-year extension, and the amended bill passed the Senate. 253
The bill went to conference committee, but the committee could not reconcile the differences in the House and Senate versions of the bill and it died. 254
This initial failure led Indian advocates and tribal leaders to redouble
their efforts. The temporary Duro fix expired during their efforts to secure a
permanent one, making the issue more pressing. 255 Indian advocates stepped
up their lobbying inside the halls of Congress and mounted an outside lobbying effort by mobilizing "an avalanche of telegrams from tribes expressing
outrage and concern about the passing of the deadline and the need for a
permanent solution." 256 The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs marked up
the second Duro fix bill, and it passed the Senate. 257 With two bills having
passed the Senate and one the House, the conference committee reconvened-this time to agree on a bill that would make the Duro fix permanent. 25 8 President George H.W. Bush signed the Duro fix into law on
October 28,

1991.259

The success of the Duro fix affected American Indian legislative advocacy in several significant ways. First, it established a precedent of using
legislative advocacy to reverse negative Supreme Court decisions. The Duro
fix demonstrated that American Indians could use the law to reframe "the
formulation of congressional acts regarding tribal power," and thus, reconceptualize the power relations between Congress and Indian nations. 26 0 In the
past, Congress had delegated power to Indian nations rather than acknowl-

250 Newton, supra note 245, at 114; see also Berger, supra note 58, at 13 ("Opponents
of
the bill were overwhelmed by witness after witness from Indian organizations and tribes.").
"' Newton, supra note 245, at 114.
2 52
Id. at 115.
253 Id. at 115-16 (providing details on the compromise).
254 Id. at 116. Newton attributed this impasse to neither side wanting to compromise. The
House members insisted on making the Duro fix permanent while the Senate members of the
conference
committee felt bound to honor the compromise they made with Senator Gorton. Id.
2 55
Id. at 116.
2 56
Id. at 117.
5
7 Id.
258 Id.
2 59

Id.

2

6

Berger, supra note 58, at 13.
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edged the inherent sovereignty possessed by them. 26 1 Delegation had the potential to limit tribal power by subjecting it to constitutional restrictions not
applicable to Indian nations otherwise. 26 2 Savvy Indian advocates saw the
danger of a Duro fix that delegated authority to Indian nations. 26 3 As an
alternative, they proposed new language that would reiterate the status of
Indian nations as separate governments with their own inherent powers. 2 64
Consequently, instead of delegating power to Indian nations and suggesting
that they occupy a lesser position as sovereigns, Congress "recognized and
reaffirmed" the "inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians." 2 65 This language ensured that the Supreme
Court "could only hold that Congress intended that tribes exercising jurisdiction over non-members under the Duro fix were exercising inherent tribal, not federal, power, and the Constitution did not prevent this result." 266 In
effect, by adopting this language, Congress reasserted its importance, and
historical primacy, in the area of Indian affairs and signaled to American
Indians and the courts that it could and would act to restore tribal sovereignty. Moreover, American Indians learned that they could effectively use
the law to leverage institutional dynamics. Knowing the power of the Court
to undermine a legislative victory, they had lobbied for-and Congress
adopted-language that limited the Court's ability to interpret the statute
against their interests. This lesson would shape future legislative efforts by
American Indians.
Second, the success of the Duro fix encouraged Indian nations and tribal organizations to embark on additional campaigns to reverse negative Supreme Court decisions. Since the Duro fix, advocates have proposed
legislation to overturn several other Supreme Court decisions.26 7 After the
Supreme Court restricted tribal court jurisdiction in Nevada v. Hicks,2 6 8 tribal
advocates, including the NCAI, sought congressional reaffirmations of tribal
criminal and civil jurisdiction. 2 69 Similarly, Indian nations have sought to
overturn Salazar v. Carcieri and allow all Indian nations to take land into
trust under 25 U.S.C. § 465 since 2011.270 Most significantly, however,
261 Id.; see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 715 (1983) (delegating federal power to
Indian tribes).
262 Berger, supra note 58, at 13.
263 Berger, supra note 58, at 13; Newton, supra note 245, at 112.
264 Berger, supra note 58, at
13.
265 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2014).
266 Berger, supra note 58, at
13.
267 The Supreme Court decisions are: Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Seminole Tribe of Indians v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); and
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
268 533 U.S. at 363-70 (holding that tribe could not hear civil rights claims against state
police arising out of search on-reservation for evidence of off-reservation crimes).
269 See Tribes Seek to Overturn Supreme Court, INDIANZ.COM (Feb. 27, 2002), http://www
[https://perma.cclF5SS-CHH8]
.indianz.com/News/printme.asp?ID= lawO2/02272002-1
(describing the legislative proposals drafted to restore tribal sovereignty after Hicks).
270 See, e.g., Rob Capriccioso, Tester Introduces Clean Carcieri Fix, U.S. S. AND E.
ThIkBES, INC. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.usetinc.org/news/tester-introduces-clean-carcieri-fix/
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American Indian advocates commenced a long-term campaign to partially
reverse the Supreme Court's decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish,271 prohibiting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, as part of the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act. 27 2 Advocates adopted language
similar to that used in the Duro fix and argued for a section restoring the
inherent power of tribal governments to exercise special criminal jurisdiction
over all persons committing specific intimate-partner-related crimes in Indian country. 273 These efforts came to fruition with the Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013.274 Once again, astute Indian advocates
used a legislative strategy to reconfigure the power dynamics between Indian nations and the U.S. government and to protect Indian country from
further encroachment on its sovereignty by hostile courts.
Moreover, the success of the Duro fix stimulated American Indians to
use legislative advocacy more broadly. American Indians interpreted the legislative success of the Duro fix as tribal advocacy paying off in a Congress
more supportive of Indian issues than the Court.275 Scholars, tribal leaders,
and advocates started suggesting that Congress may be more responsive than
the courts to Indian interests. 276 Some even argued that Congress is the most
appropriate institution within the U.S. government to make federal Indian
law and policy and that the courts should defer heavily to Congress. 277
This perception of Congress as a more favorable institution encouraged
Indian nations and organizations to engage in legislative strategies across a
wide range of issues. For example, Indian nations have turned to Congress to
argue for the congressional restoration of their government-to-government
status, 278 to acquire homelands, 279 to protect and repatriate their cultural ob-

[https://perma.cc/N2S5-N6SJ];

Rob Capriccioso, Tribal Lease Bill Clears Senate After

Carcieri Wrangling, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (July 18, 2012), https://web

.archive.org/web/20120814231240/http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/07/18/
tribal-lease-bill-clears-senate-after-carcieri-wrangling-124131
[https://perma.cc/W5LXS2T2].
271 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978).
272 See Congress May Restore Tribal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians Under the Following,
RESTORATION NATIVE SOVEREIGNTY & SAFETY FOR NATIVE WOMEN MAG., Mar. 2013, at 5.
273 See id.
274 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub.
L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat.
54, 122.
275 By 2001, tribal leaders and advocates in Indian country formed
the Tribal Supreme
Court Project, which seeks to "strengthen tribal advocacy before the U.S. Supreme Court."
What is the Tribal Supreme Court Project?, NATIvE AM. RTS. FUND, http://sct.narf.org [https:/
/perma.cc/HSK3-X47R] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). The Project monitors and coordinates
litigation in Indian country. Id. It also advises tribal leaders about whether to appeal a case to
the Supreme Court. Id.
276 See, e.g., Getches, supra note 56, at 276-77 (suggesting that the legislative process has
advantages over adjudication).
277 See, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, supra note 239, 483; Michalyn Steele,
Comparative InstitutionalCompetency and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 85 U. Coo. L. REV.
759, 765, 814 (2014).
278 See, e.g., Haynal, supra note 58, at 294-96 (recounting the efforts of the Klamath
tribes of Oregon to regain federal recognition congressionally from 1975 to 1986).

2019]

Lobbying Against the Odds

69

jects and remains,2 8 0 to settle natural resource claims, 28 1 and to gain federal
recognition as Indian tribes.282
The institutional dynamics around American Indian policymaking
shifted as the courts' receptivity towards American Indian claims declined in
the early 1980s. American Indians had increased their lobbying efforts in the
1970s, so they had gained considerable experience and skill in lobbying by
the time the Supreme Court grew hostile to their claims. With little hope of
vindication of their rights in court, American Indians had no choice but to
continue to lobby Congress for help. Indian advocates built on their earlier
experiences and expanded their lobbying efforts. They used legislative advocacy to enact statutes that redefined their relationship with the U.S. government and protected their rights from hostile courts.
D.

Resources: Legislative Advocacy and the Rise of Indian Gaming

For most of the twentieth century, almost all American Indians lacked
the financial resources to engage in lobbying.283 The rise of gaming by Indian nations in the late twentieth century has provided some but not all tribes
with financial resources to invest in legislative strategies.28 4
American Indian legislative advocacy predates gaming, 285 but has increased steadily and consistently with the growth of gaming. 28 6 In 1987, the
Supreme Court held that Indian nations could operate gaming establishments
287
free of state regulation in Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.
Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") a year
later. 288 Gaming in Indian country has grown tremendously ever since, with

.

279 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 58, at 434-38 (describing the successful efforts of the
Timbisha Shoshone to obtain legislation providing them with homeland from 1994 to 2000).
280 See, e.g., Dumont, supra note 58, at 10 (discussing the efforts of Indian nations, pantribal organizations, and Native Hawaiians to secure passage of the Native American Graves
and Repatriation Act).
281 See, e.g., Benjamin A. Kahn, Sword or Submission? American Indian Natural Resource Claims Settlement Legislation, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109, 113 (2012).
282 For example, the number of non-federally recognized Indian groups seeking recognition legislatively spiked after the Duro fix in 1991. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress,
Tribal Recognition, and Legislative-AdministrativeMultiplicity, 91 INo. L.J. 955, 972 (2016).
For a discussion of why non-federally recognized Indian groups chose legislative strategies,
see Carlson, supra note 67, at 941-58.
283 See Cornell, supra note 28, at 129-30 (describing lack of Indian financial resources to
engage in politics until 1970s).
284 Many scholars have linked rises in political mobilization, both at the state and federal
levels, to gaming. See, e.g., Corntassel & Witmer, supra note 59, at 522; Witmer & Boehmke,
supra note 65, at 139; STEVEN ANDREw LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L. RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND
TkIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE 65-69 (2005).
285 See infra Part HI fig.3.
286 LIGHT & RAND, supra note 282, at 65-69
2 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987).
28 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (2012); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2012). Interestingly, Indian
nations did not uniformly support the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. For a
detailed history of the IGRA's enactment. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Enactment of the
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just under half of all tribes engaging in gaming operations today.289 The effects of gaming remain uneven-with only a few tribes experiencing spectacular success-but it has provided some tribes with new resources to
invest in lobbying. 290
By introducing new financial resources into Indian country, gaming has
enabled Indian nations with profitable gambling operations to engage in legislative strategies. 29 1 Gaming revenues provide these tribes with resources
"to employ skilled lobbyists and savvy public relations firms . . . 'to win
influence, make friends, and crush opponents' in a manner heretofore unknown." 2 92 Thus, as gaming revenues have skyrocketed from a few million
dollars in 1985 to 28 billion dollars in 2015, expenditures spent on lobbying
have also risen, albeit inconsistently. 293 Indian nations engaged in gaming
have exceeded non-gaming Indian nations in reporting lobbying since
1995.294 Gaming tribes lobby more consistently over time than non-gaming
tribes 295 and report spending more on lobbying expenditures than non-gaming tribes. On average, Indian nations engaged in gaming report spending
twice as much annually on lobbying as Indian nations not engaged in gaming. 296 The Indian nations that report spending the most money on lobbying-over $200,000 annually-run some of the most profitable gaming
operations. For example, the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, the
Jicarilla Apache Nation, the Gila River Indian Community, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, the
Oneida Indian Nation, the Pechanga Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, the

Seminole Tribe of Florida, the Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana, and the

&

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988: The Return of the Buffalo to Indian Country or Another Federal Usurpation of Tribal Sovereignty?, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17 (2010).
289 See Dispelling the Myths About Indian Gaming, NATIVE Am. RTS.
FUND, https://
web.archive.org/web/201505 12032353/www.narf.org/indian-gaming/ [https://perma.cc/GS6PNULP] (last visited Nov. 5, 2018).
2" See id. (reporting that forty percent of all gaming revenue is concentrated in the hands
of a few small tribes located near major urban areas and that other tribes with gaming operations "are only marginally profitable").
291 LIGHT & RAND, supra note 282, at 65-66; Witmer & Boehmke, supra note 65, at 132
(explaining resource mobilization theory and how it applies to gaming tribes).
292 WILKINS & STARK, supra note 8, at 165-66.
293 See infra Part III fig.4; see also Randall K. Q. Akee et
al., The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and Its Effects on American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. Eco. PERSPS. 185,
194 (2015). Figures depicting lobbying expenditures and annual gaming revenues closely mirror one another with consistent growth until about 2006. While lobbying expenditures decreased from 2007 to 2010, see infra Part III fig.5, gaming revenues leveled off around the
same time, see Akee et al., supra, at 194.
24 See supra Part m fig.4; see also Witmer & Boehmke, supra note 65, at 139 (reporting
that "far more gaming tribes than non-gaming tribes actively engage in lobbying members of
Congress"). The increase in legislative mobilization is not limited to Congress. Several recent
studies document the influence of gaming revenues on state politics. See MASON, supra note 7,
at 70-145; CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 64, at 125-33; see generally HANSEN
SKOPEK, supra note 64.
295 See Witmer & Boehmke, supra note 65, at 139.
296
See supra Part III.
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Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians-all tribes with lucrative gaming operations-report spending the most on lobbying annually. 297
The increase in legislative advocacy stimulated by gaming, however, is
not limited to lobbying related to gaming or Indian affairs. Gaming tribes
have strong incentives to lobby to protect their businesses and governmental
interests, but they lobby on other issues as well. They have "seized the opportunity to express their positions on a variety of other issues of importance
to them." 298 Thus, gaming has enabled some tribes to weigh in on issues that
seem unrelated to gaming or tribal affairs and, as a result, expand their policy influence. 299 Tribes have reported lobbying on federal appropriations, taxation, transportation, and natural resources. 3 m As a result, the effects of
American Indian lobbying reach beyond the individual tribes engaging in it.
Gaming, or rather the introduction of new financial resources into Indian country as a result of it, has facilitated the growth in American Indian
legislative advocacy. It has provided some Indian nations with the financial
resources necessary to advocate legislatively and to expand their lobbying
efforts.
E.

Opposition: The Backlash to Gaming and Legislative Advocacy

The new resources provided to Indian country by gaming, however,
have had crosscutting impacts on legislative advocacy. Gaming has not only
stimulated the use of legislative strategies by providing the money to hire
lobbyists, but also it has encouraged a growing backlash movement against
Indian-owned casinos and Indian country more generally.3 0 1 Opposition to
American Indian interests is not new, but the rise of Indian gaming and the
political power thought to accompany it has reinvigorated anti-Indian sentiments.302 These sentiments, however, are not simply lodged against the most
successful gaming tribes.303 Rather, they pervade Indian country and often
contribute to stereotypes and misperceptions of American Indians. 304 Contrary to these misguided notions of Indians as rich,305 American Indians "re-

See supra Part III.
Frederick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Tribal Political Expenditures in California
and Washington, D.C., in HANSEN & SKOPEK, supra note 64, at 25, 34; see also Carlson, supra
297
298

note 112, at 7-9.
299 See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 8, at 165.
30 Boehmke & Witmer, in HANSEN & SKOPBK, supra note 298, 34.
30! See CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 64, at 6.
3

Id. at 28-46.
Some extremely successful gaming tribes have experienced relentless backlash attacks.
In particular, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe has faced extensive, racialized challenges both to
303

their federal recognition and their gaming enterprises. See, e.g., RENEE ANN CRAMER, CASH,
COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE POLITICS OF TRIBAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 137 (2005).

3

See id. at 105; CoRNrASSEL & WITMER, supra note 64, at 45.

Rich Indian racism is a post-IGRA phenomenon, "where false images related to indigenous gaming are created and propagated by governmental and media entities." CORNTASSEL
30s

& WITMER, supra note 64, at 4.
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main Americas poorest people" 3 06 and now may need to engage in lobbying
to protect the little they have.3 07
Countermobilization to American Indians, largely catalyzed by Indian
gaming, has both undermined and facilitated the growth in American Indian
legislative advocacy. Some American Indians have responded to this backlash by investing more in legislative strategies.3 08 For example, after facing
extensive opposition from members of the local non-Indian community, the
Gun Lake Band of Pottawatomie lobbied to reaffirm their ability to take land
into trust. 309 In other cases, strong opposition seems to have prevented Indian
groups from engaging in legislative strategies. For example, Ramapough
Chief Ronald Red Bone Van Dunk has suggested that his New Jersey-based
tribe, which was denied federal recognition by the BIA, has not pursued
legislative recognition because of the opposition it would face from Atlantic
City. 3 10

A variety of alternative explanations can be formulated for the rise in
American Indian lobbying. Some common alternatives include that the number of tribes has grown over time, reporting compliance has changed, and
public choice theories suggest that small groups fare better in the political
process. But, like the assertion that gaming has led to the increase in lobbying, the evidence shows that American Indians have been gaining momentum as lobbyists over time as the political context has changed, they have
increased their political capacity, and gaming has introduced new resources
to support their lobbying. Figure 5 displays how American Indian lobbying
has increased in relation to this confluence of events. In contrast, the number
of federally recognized tribes has increased over time but not at a rate that
could explain the increase in lobbying."' Similarly, reporting regimes and
3

NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND,

supra note 289. Moreover:

[T]he needs of reservation Indians are so great that even if the total annual Indian
gaming revenue in the country could be divided equally among all the Indians in the
country, the amount distributed per person would still not be enough to raise Indian
per capita income (currently $11,259) to anywhere near the average of $21,587.
Id.

307 As Corntassel and Witmer argue, tribes may have to use multiple
strategies to challenge rich Indian racism. CORNTASSEL & WrIMER, supra note 64, at 134-49.
30s For example, the Tigua Nation (Ysleta del Sur Pueblo) responded
to the closure of their
casino by hiring a lobbyist. CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 64, at 7. Unfortunately, the
lobbyist they hired, Jack Abramoff, scammed them out of millions of dollars. Id.
" Gale Courey Toensing, Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmed by Congress, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Nov. 7, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20141110091053/
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/11/07/gun-lake-trust-land-reaffirmed-cong
ress-157741 [https://perma.cc/B48P-SZYL].

310 MARK EDWIN MILLER, FORGOTTEN TrBES: UNRECOGNIZED INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL

PROCESs 253 (2004); see also Carlson, supra note 282, at 976 n.92 (noting that many of the non-federally recognized tribes that face tremendous state or local opposition to their recognition have not sought congressional recognition); Carlson, supra note 67, at
952.
3" The number of Indian groups gaining federal recognition slowed tremendously in the
mid-1990s, about the same time that reported lobbying dramatically increased. See Carlson,
supra note 282, at 974 (reporting the number of Indian groups gaining federal recognition
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rates of compliance have changed over time,312 but the data suggest that the
trend toward increased lobbying occurred prior to the changes in the lobbying disclosure regime which took effect in 1996.313 Moreover, the downturn
in reported lobbying by American Indians from 1996 to 1998 seems contrary
to the assertion that the new regime accounts for the increase in American
Indian lobbying. 314 It is also unlikely that the regime change accounts for the
dramatic increase in reported lobbying by American Indians in the early
2000s.
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Figure 5. Reported lobbying by American Indian organizations, including Indian nations,
1978-2012, in relation to changes in the political context, institutional dynamics, and
resources.

Public choice theory also provides an alternative explanation for the
increase in American Indian lobbying.3 15 In terms of legislative advocacy,

either administratively or legislative from 1975 to 2013). Moreover, the federal recognition of
Indian groups slowed even more after 2000, see id., yet reported lobbying by American Indians continued to increase, see infra fig.5.
312 LAPIRA, supra note 82, at 238-44.
313 Further undermining the regime change explanation is the fact that reported lobbying
by the general population increased in the late 1990s. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 82, at 203
(noting that reported lobbying nearly doubled within six months after the Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995 went into effect). The fact that reported lobbying by American Indians decreased
suggests that the regime change was not driving their lobbying strategies.
31 Most scholars suspect that lobbyists underreport lobbying activities. LAPiRA, supra
note 82, at 225 (discussing the existence of shadow lobbyists).
31 Public choice theory suggests that interest groups are more likely to influence Congress to enact client policies, or statutes that concentrate benefits on special interests while
distributing their costs to the general public. JAMES Q. WILSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES 432-33 (5th ed. 1992). Conversely, interest groups are less
likely to influence Congress to enact general or majoritarian policies that distribute benefits
and costs broadly across large numbers of people or entrepreneurial policies that benefit large
numbers of people at the expense of a small, identifiable segment of society. See, e.g., Wu-
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public choice theory suggests that groups will have incentives to engage in
legislative strategies when their interests are not salient to the larger public
and are perceived as narrow, technical, or nonpartisan. 1 6 To the extent that
American Indians lobby on narrow issues specific to them, public choice
theory seems to provide a viable explanation for the increase in lobbying.
The evidence presented here, however, suggests that American Indian lobbying has increased generally across a range of issues affecting tribes both
individually and nationally. Some of these issues are highly contested, of
interest to the general public, and do not only benefit Indians. This suggests
that public choice theories do not adequately explain the general increase in
lobbying by American Indians over time.
VII.

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING

STRATEGIC ADVOCACY

AND FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

This Part explores some of the implications of this research for studies
of advocacy strategies, interest groups, and federal Indian law. Part VII.A
considers how the framework builds on and improves current understandings
of how groups choose advocacy strategies. Part VII.B highlights the new and
important questions that the Article raises for the study of federal Indian law.
A.

Strategic Advocacy

The implications of this research for sociolegal and interest group studies are significant. The dramatic rise in American Indian legislative advocacy suggests that the conventional wisdom that groups litigate because they
are foreclosed from the political process simply does not explain a world in
which advocates increasingly rely on multi-institutional and non-judicial advocacy strategies.317 More complicated narratives exist for how groups respond to multiple, interactive, and often reinforcing influences in crafting
advocacy strategies. As a result, sociolegal and interest group scholars need
to develop more complex approaches to understanding how and why groups
develop different advocacy strategies over time. This Article contributes to
this larger project by presenting a more generalizable and nuanced approach
to studying how groups make advocacy decisions across institutions over
time.
This Article improves upon the sociolegal approach for understanding
why groups litigate by adding insights from the interest group literature to
provide more complete explanations of advocates' strategic choices. This approach starts from the premise emerging in the literature that advocates
choose strategies in response to social, institutional, and political opportuniLIAM N. ESKRTDGE, JR. ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE

CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 59-60 (4th ed. 2007).
316 EsKRIDGE, supra note 315, at 62.
31 See supra note 10.
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ties and constraints."' Borrowing from the interest group literature, it identifies the potentially relevant factors influencing the development of
legislative advocacy strategies and integrates them into an interactive, sociolegal perspective. Viewing advocacy strategy development through this interactive lens allows for examination of how the dynamics and interactions
among factors influence advocates' strategic choices. This approach highlights the evolving nature of advocacy decisions, including the ways in
which groups shape society through the claims they make and how those
claims are in turn shaped by the institutions and social contexts in which
they are raised. As a result, it provides a more comprehensive view of the
choices advocates make and the opportunities and constraints they face in
crafting strategies because it considers how institutional differences and relationships influence the choices advocates make. Revealing the multitude of
considerations underlying advocates' choices and the relationships among
them, thus, allows for identification of the multiple pathways leading advocates to pursue different advocacy strategies.
My analysis of American Indian legislative advocacy serves as an illustrative example of the utility and richness of this approach. It demonstrates
how groups respond to multiple interactive, and often reinforcing, influences
in crafting advocacy strategies. Figure 6 portrays these interactions and how
they contributed to the escalation in American Indian lobbying at the end of
the twentieth century.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, American Indians increased their
lobbying when the odds still appeared to be against them. Lobbying emerged
as a viable strategy for American Indians in the late 1970s when the courts
were still largely receptive to their claims and before gaming infused some
tribes with new financial resources to support their efforts. A perceived
change in the receptivity of Congress toward Indian claims reflected in the
Tribal Self-Determination Policy opened the door for American Indians to
lobby. The creation of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs then provided
access to Congress and new opportunities for American Indians to engage in
legislative strategies. Lacking in financial resources and electoral clout,
American Indians nonetheless used these opportunities to build relationships
with members of Congress and their staffers, which further ensured their
access to the legislative process. Thus, American Indians were committed to
and skilled at using lobbying strategies by the time the Supreme Court became more hostile toward their claims in the late 1980s. The Supreme
Court's increasing reluctance to uphold tribal rights simply further pushed
American Indians toward the legislative arena. Similarly, the emergence of
gaming and the money it introduced into Indian country provided some Indian nations with the financial resources to lobby Congress more actively
and reinforced the existing trend toward legislative advocacy by American
Indians.
31

See supra Part III.
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Figure 6. Interactions among multiple variables leading to increased American Indian
lobbying from 1978-2012.
A few final observations suggest the broader implications of this approach for sociolegal and interest group studies. First, my approach shows
how scholars can develop richer accounts of groups' strategic decisionmaking by detailing how various factors interact to shape and reshape institutional choices over time. The role of the political context in facilitating
American Indian legislative mobilization in the 1970s illuminates how considering the dynamics among variables produces a more comprehensive account. Congress's support of Indian affairs through the creation of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs signaled to American Indians that Congress
might be receptive to their lobbying. As previous studies have shown, this
government support encouraged legislative advocacy by creating a political
context conducive to it.m'9 But the committee's formation did more than signal support. It also changed the opportunity structure by providing access for
American Indian advocates. These two factors-access and government support-occurred simultaneously and reinforced each other's influence. The interaction of these two variables developed into a self-reinforcing pattern (or
feedback loop) as American Indians used their increased access to garner
more governmental support. Once they had access, they built relationships
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with members of Congress and their staff, which enabled them both to shape
a political context favorable to their claims and to build their political capacity. Accounts that do not consider the dynamics among the variables often
obscure or miss entirely these interactions and reinforcing mechanisms.
A second important implication of my account is that it indicates that
scholars and advocates need to think more carefully and critically about the
multitude of possible interactions among different institutions and how those
interactions affect advocates' strategic choices. Sociolegal scholars have
long recognized the importance of institutional dynamics in the context of
legal mobilization.3 20 For example, scholars have recently noted that judicial
risk-or the recognition that the courts may not be willing to recognize
rights as broad as a group wants-may discourage advocates from litigating.3 2 1 My findings, however, suggest that institutional dynamics may play
more complicated roles in group advocacy decisions. American Indians did
not engage in legislative strategies in a vacuum-they made calculated decisions about how best to pursue their legal claims in an ever-changing legal
and political world. Like previous interest group studies, my account stresses
the importance government support plays in groups' decisions to lobby.3 22
The rise in American Indian legislative advocacy depended not only upon
American Indians' decisions to act but on a pro-Indian congressional policy
and increased political access to members of Congress and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. But it diverges from most sociolegal accounts,
which describe legislative advocacy as a response to a hostile court or an
effort to enforce an important court decision.3 23 Instead, American Indians
seized an opportunity to make their claims to Congress even though their
chances of success seemed slim and they had alternative institutions open to
them. These results contradict the classic argument that minority groups litigate because they are excluded from the political process and suggest that
groups may turn to legislative advocacy more frequently and in different
ways than previously thought. The traditional sociolegal emphasis on how
groups use political strategies to supplement or implement litigation strategies may be too narrow. Advocates may pursue legislative advocacy in a
variety of circumstances, including, but not limited to, as a parallel, an alternative, a complement, or a precursor to litigation.
Moreover, my findings highlight how advocates pay close attention to
the various institutional options and the dynamics among them in crafting
advocacy strategies. In contrast, most scholars have studied advocacy decisions based on advocates targeting one primary institution and paid less attention to how advocates consider the alternatives.32 4 Such singular
approaches may be too simplistic and overlook important influences on
supra note 145, at 524; Steinman, supra note 171, at 763.
supra note 145, at 524.
See e.g., Leech et al., supra note 11, at 21.
See, e.g., Cummings & Rhode, supra note 14, at 616-17.
See supra Part H.A.
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group decisionmaking. American Indians did not initially turn to Congress
because they were losing in the Supreme Court, but as the Court and their
perceptions of its receptivity towards their claims changed, they had more
incentives to continue to use legislative strategies. Shifting institutional dynamics, thus, reinforced American Indians' decisions to lobby and expanded
their legislative strategies to include efforts to overturn unfavorable Supreme
Court decisions.32 5 But advocates may have other reasons for pursuing multiinstitutional venue strategies. They may want to maximize coordination
among institutions,3 26 highlight problems in another institutional process, or
play institutions off one another.3 27 My findings suggest that groups may
choose strategies in relation to their assessments about other options and that
their strategies may shift over time as their assessments change. As a result,
scholars need to continually check their assumptions and pay more attention
to institutional dynamics-when and why the political process may be more
appealing to specific groups at certain times than the courts or other
institutions.
My approach devises a way for scholars to study different venue options and the relationships among them in a more integrated fashion by incorporating consideration of the various institutional options and how they
relate to one another into investigations of venue choice. This emphasis allows for examination of how institutional relationships affect how and why
advocates choose particular strategies.
My results also contribute to a growing literature on how groups use the
law in non-judicial settings by highlighting how American Indians have used
legal arguments and frameworks in their legislative advocacy to craft substantive federal Indian law and policy beneficial to them.3 28 My findings
build on these earlier studies by demonstrating how groups consider the relationships among courts and legislatures in their lobbying efforts. American
Indians have sometimes paid particularly close attention to how the Supreme
Court would interpret legislation during the drafting process. For example, in
the case of the Duro fix, they drafted statutory language and developed a
legislative history that limited the Court's ability to interpret the statute
against their interests. This indicates that advocates consider not only the
options among institutions but also how the institutions may interact with
one another later in time in their advocacy strategies. While this insight is
not new, my findings illustrate how advocates consider future litigation in
their legislative strategies as well as how litigation may affect politics or

" See supra Part VI.C.
Steinman, supra note 171, at 763 (discussing how advocates could use conscious coordination of legal and political strategies to increase their chances of success); Paris, supra note
19, at 631 (same).
327 Carlson, supra note at 67, 958-59, 961-62.
328 See, e.g., id. at 958-59.
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require later political mobilization for enforcement.3

29

Accordingly, future
studies should pay more attention to how advocates consider various interactions among institutions over time in crafting and coordinating more longterm advocacy strategies.
Finally, by questioning existing assumptions about the power of groups
to use the political process, my results contribute to contemporary debates
over how to understand and measure power and powerlessness for doctrinal
purposes. They suggest that the dichotomy between powerful and powerless
used to identify suspect classes in existing equal protection doctrine may
oversimplify reality. 3 0 Groups may exercise power in some contexts but not
others. Thus, my research challenges scholars and judges to think more carefully about what power is, how to conceptualize and measure it, and what it
means for groups to exercise it. Moreover, it suggests that future studies
should investigate how, when, and why other marginalized groups exercise
power in the political process and identify the different conditions leading to
power and powerlessness.
B.

Federal Indian Law

This Article also has important implications for the study of federal
Indian law and American Indian advocacy. First, it debunks the prevailing
myth that gaming has led to the increase in American Indian legislative lobbying by presenting original quantitative data on American Indians' reported
lobbying over a thirty-five year period. The collection and analysis of data
on lobbying and lobbying expenditures by American Indians both before and
after the rise of Indian gaming allows for important comparative analysis
over time, missing from earlier studies.' The analysis confirms earlier studies' conclusions that gaming has created opportunities and incentives for Indian tribes to engage in lobbying.33 2 It also reveals that the increase in
reported Indian lobbying predates the rise of gaming and that reported lobbying expenditures have not consistently increased since the advent of gaming. My findings, thus, indicate that gaming plays a more complicated role in
American Indian lobbying on the federal level than the prevailing narrative
suggests. They suggest the need for scholars to question their assumptions
about the role of gaming in influencing American Indian lobbying and de-

329 See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, LAW's ALLURE, supra note 144, at 1-3 (considering how litigation may affect politics).
330 See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, PoliticalPowerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1527,
1527 (2015) (trying to theorize and operationalize political powerlessness to identify suspect
classes for equal protection purposes); Bertrall L. Ross, 11 & Su Li, Measuring Political
Power: Suspect Class Determinationsand the Poor, 104 CALiw. L. REv. 323, 377-79 (2016)
(arguing for a holistic definition of a group's power in applications of equal protection
doctrine).
331 See Witmer & Boehmke, supra note 65, at 132 (analyzing lobbying and gaming compacts after signing of IGRA in 1989).
332 See id.
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velop more nuanced explanations of when and why American Indians craft
advocacy strategies over time.
Second, the data reveal the staggering growth in American Indian legislative advocacy over the past thirty-five years. This incredible growth raises
important questions about the efficacy of this advocacy. How successful are
American Indians at enacting policies beneficial to them? How successful
are they at preventing the enactment of policies detrimental to them? Are
some tribes more successful than others? Does success depend on the issue
being advocated on?333 These questions merit investigation. Even if they are
not entirely successful in their advocacy efforts, American Indians are
clearly playing a larger role in the creation of federal Indian law and policy
than they did three decades ago when they lobbied less frequently. The tactics American Indians are using in lobbying deserve closer attention to determine if and how they are affecting the drafting, introduction, and
progression of bills through the legislative process.3M
Third, the infusion of American Indian voices into the legislative process may contribute to substantive changes in the content of legislation governing American Indians, especially if they are playing an increased role in
drafting legislation. As my account demonstrates, American Indians largely
shaped the language of the legislation restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians.33 5 They intentionally crafted the statutory text to
limit the Supreme Court's ability to overturn the statute. Their efforts extended beyond that statute as they used the language as a template for drafting the section of the Violence Against Women Act of 2013 that restored the
inherent power of tribal governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
all persons committing specific intimate-partner-related crimes in Indian
country.33 6 American Indians may have an impact on the substantive context
of legislation in other areas as well. 3 37 The evidence shows that they lobby
on a broad range of issues so the potential for such influence may extend
beyond Indian-related policies. 338 Future studies should more closely examine how exactly American Indians are engaging in legislative advocacy
and what impact it could have on the substantive content of federal Indian
law.
Finally, like recent studies on Indian nations' use of interest group strategies on the state and local level, my findings show that Indian nations are
increasingly turning to institutions other than the federal courts to influence

333 Public choice theories suggest that the issue lobbied on could affect American Indian
legislative success. See supra Part VII.A.
334 For an initial exploration of how tribes have used legislative strategies to argue for
policies beneficial to them, see Carlson, supra note 202.
33
5 See supra Part VI.C.
336 See, e.g., Congress May Restore Tribal Jurisdiction, supra note 272, at 1, 5.
3 For an investigation into how tribal lobbying efforts influence substantive provisions in
federal statutes, see Carlson, supra note 202.
3
1 1 See supra Part VI.D.
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the creation of federal Indian law.339 These findings run contrary to the bulk
of federal Indian law scholarship, which has traditionally focused on court
decisions. They suggest the need for more research into how federal Indian
law is made in non-judicial settings.
VEJ.

CONCLUSION

Popular narratives maintain that groups lacking political power, electoral influence, and resources litigate because they cannot use legislative strategies to achieve their goals. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, the new
empirical evidence presented in this Article documents a 600 percent increase in legislative advocacy by American Indians in the past three decades.
This discrepancy suggests the need for more accurate explanations of how
and why groups choose advocacy strategies. This Article presents a new approach for understanding how and why groups engage in advocacy strategies
across institutions over time. It integrates the factors identified by interest
group scholars as influencing advocates' decisions to lobby into the interactive approach to strategic decisionmaking formulated by sociolegal scholars.
This approach highlights the evolving nature of advocacy decisions, including the ways in which groups shape society through the claims they make
and how those claims are in turn shaped by the institutions and social contexts in which they are raised. As a result, it provides a more comprehensive
view of the choices advocates make and the opportunities and constraints
they face in crafting strategies because it considers how institutional differences and relationships influence those choices.
The Article demonstrates the utility of this approach through a case
study of American Indian advocacy from 1978 to 2012. American Indians
started lobbying more frequently in the 1970s even though they lacked political power and the odds appeared stacked against them. My account produces a richer narrative about how and why this happened. It reveals that
multiple factors influenced American Indians to pursue legislative strategies,
and that these factors often interacted with one another to encourage or undercut the development of American Indian advocacy strategies over time.
In particular, this account of American Indian legislative advocacy highlights how institutional dynamics may influence lobbying strategies. As a
result, it encourages scholars and advocates to question the conventional narrative about when and why groups lobby and to think more carefully and
critically about the multitude of possible interactions among different institutions and how those dynamics affect advocates' strategic choices.
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